What bearing these sentiments have on the limitation of the atonement, will still more distinctly appear by the following quotations. “That there is as truly a federal relation between Christ and the members of his mystical body, the church [the elect antecedent to their faith], as there was between Adam and his natural descendants, the Scriptures abundantly manifest: and it is this federal relation which laid the foundation for the imputation of their sins to Christ. But according to the sentiments opposed,—no such relation ever existed; there was no real imputation of sin to Christ, nor any proper punishment inflicted on him for it: consequently the penal sanction of the law, with reference to those who are saved, has never been endured. For were these important facts admitted, it is easy to perceive that redemption must of necessity be limited; because no one could righteously perish for whose sins plenary satisfaction had been made to divine justice.” “They insist that what Christ paid for our redemption was not the same with what is in the obligation, and that therefore his dolorous sufferings were not a proper payment of our debt; and consequently a proper and full satisfaction for our sins could not arise from his death to the law and justice of God. For were this satisfaction conceded, they see at once that the delinquents for whom it was made must inevitably be saved” (Geth. p. 10, 11, 20, 21).Edward D. Griffin, “An Humble Attempt to Reconcile the Differences of Christians Respecting the Extent of the Atonement,” in The Atonement: Discourses and Treatises (Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 1859), 220–24.
This whole system goes upon the principle that the atonement was a legal transaction, partaking of a commercial nature, as if money had been paid for the redemption of so many captives and no more, or for the discharge of the debt of so many imprisoned bankrupts and no more; in which case, as all can see, the ransomed captives or exonerated debtors would have a legal claim to a discharge. To make out a parallel case in a transaction where no money was paid, it is necessary to establish a personal identity (for I can call it by no other name), between the representative and the represented, which they denominate a legal oneness (the justice of which depended on his previous consent), and to make him legally guilty by imputation, and legally and justly adjudged to punishment in the room of those whom he represented, and to make him suffer a literal and legal punishment, the same in kind and degree that the law had threatened to that particular number. In this way law and justice were literally satisfied and could demand no more; and those whose debt was thus discharged can claim of law and justice a release, and cannot legally or justly be punished again, but have a righteousness legally their own by imputation, and which legally and justly entitles them to justification; and yet not a legal claim to justification in their own persons, but in their Surety; they virtually possessing two persons, one demanding of the law condemnation, the other demanding of the law justification: and all this not depending on their faith; for one of the blessings to which (though unconscious of it) they have this legal claim, is the gift of faith. The result is, that Christ was a surety, sponsor, or representative for none but those who will be saved, and could not justly suffer for any whose sins were not thus finally taken from them and laid upon him.
Had a legal oneness between Christ and believers (as relates to justification, not to the amount of his sufferings) been asserted, it would not have limited the atonement; for it would still have left to all a chance to come into this relation to him by believing; and that would have been an atonement for all as moral agents. It was necessary to extend the oneness so far as to limit the sufferings: for had they been sufficient for all, it must be acknowledged, since the benefit is offered to all, that they change the relations of all, so that they can be pardoned if they will believe; which again makes out an atonement for all as moral agents. And if the oneness must be so extended as to affect the amount of sufferings, it cannot lie between Christ and those indiscriminately who would believe, but between him and a certain number of designated individuals, whose sins could be exactly weighed. And the oneness must have been established before he suffered, as his sufferings were to be their legal punishment. In every point of view the system must take this precise shape, in order to bear upon a limited atonement, which, as the author of Gethsemane conclusively pleads, can be supported on no other ground. The oneness must be legal to limit the sufferings; and when their limit is to be fixed, the number and individuals for whom they are to be endured must be known; and since the infliction is to be legal, it cannot take place till the union is first formed. It is of course a vital principle of the system that a legal oneness was established in the covenant of redemption between Christ and the elect, which exists of course before they believe, and existed before he died, and was the ground of the imputation of their sins to him; that the elect as elect were regarded in the covenant as his body, his members, his church, his spiritual seed, standing in the same relation to him that the posterity of Adam do to their federal head; in short, that antecedent to all faith, a complete legal oneness existed between the elect and Christ. He was legally bound to suffer their punishment both in measure and kind; and bonds being given to that effect, they had, though unknown to themselves, a legal claim to a discharge.
There are, I conceive, two errors in this system. The first is, that it makes the union which really subsists between Christ and believers to lie between Christ and the elect. The second is, that it supposes a legal oneness, a legal imputation, a legal obligation to suffer, a legal punishment, a legal satisfaction, and a legal claim on the part of the redeemed. We admit a very intimate union between Christ and believers, and that kind of imputation both of sin and righteousness which consists in treatment, and a bond on him to suffer imposed by a divine command, and the infliction of that which answered every purpose of a legal punishment, and a full satisfaction yielded to the Protector of the law, and the claim of believers on the promise of God. But we deny that either of these is legal. The mistake of supposing them such has wholly arisen from drawing literal conclusions from figurative premises. Because Christ is said to be one with believers or his church, he is legally one with the elect. Because he is said to have been made sin for us (by which is meant that he was treated as a sinner), he became legally guilty by imputation. Because the Lawgiver demanded satisfaction of him by commanding him to die, law and justice made the demand. Because the iniquity of all is said to have been laid on him, he sustained the literal and legal punishment of sin. Because he was dragged to execution like a criminal, and fell under the stroke of him who was wont to act as the legal Executioner, law and justice were literally executed upon him. Because he rendered full satisfaction to the Protector of the law, by securing its authority as fully as though it had been literally executed, he satisfied both law and justice. Because by a covenant claim he bound the arm of the Lawgiver and Executioner not to strike believers, he bound the law itself not to strike the elect. Because we are said to be made the righteousness of God in him (by which is meant that we are treated as righteous, or have the complete use of a righteousness, or possess a gracious title to justification through the righteousness of the Redeemer), we are considered in the eye of the law as righteous. Because by his obedience he fulfilled all the demands of the law against himself, and answered all the purposes of our perfect obedience, and by his death accomplished all the ends of a literal execution of the penalty, and thus became the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth, he wrought out a legal righteousness for the elect. And because God, having thus secured the authority of the law, can be just to himself, to his government, and to every interest, while yet he is the justifier of him that believeth, the justification of the elect is an act of distributive justice to them. Thus by pressing, in some instances, the figurative language of Scripture into a literal meaning, and by twisting the truth a very little in others, they arrive at all the conclusions which have been enumerated.
In proceeding to detect the mistakes of this system, I must begin by remarking, that the atonement had none of the attributes of a commercial transaction. Christ paid no money for us, he only suffered. There are two figures of a commercial nature which are commonly applied to the subject. The first represents Christ as paying a ransom for the redemption of captives, or purchasing his church; the second exhibits him as discharging the debts of imprisoned bankrupts. The former is derived from the Scriptures. I have already admitted that the higher ransom, which involved the service of his obedience “unto death,” was limited to the elect. Their salvation was promised him as the reward of that service. When he had fulfilled his part of the contract, he became justly entitled to the recompense, as a man is to an article which he has purchased. In this sense he may be said to have purchased the elect. And though the price is represented to be his blood, yet it was the merit of obedience in laying down that blood which really earned the reward. But this is altogether different from the atonement. When the atonement is spoken of as a ransom, it is only a price laid down to enable captives to come out if they will. If this distinction is kept in mind, all the appeals to our sense of commercial justice respecting the ransom will come to nothing.
The other figure, so far as I recollect, is purely of human invention. The Scriptures, I believe, nowhere speak of Christ’s paying the debt even of believers, much less of the elect as such. They speak of the debt as still remaining, and as being, after repentance and faith, gratuitously forgiven. They teach us to pray, “Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors.” They illustrate our discharge by the case of a servant who owed his lord ten thousand talents and had nothing to pay, to whom, in answer to his entreaties, his lord forgave the whole. Nor can it be overlooked, that this notion of paying our debt stands diametrically opposed to every idea of pardon, and to all those representations of a free and gracious justification with which the Scriptures abound. What remission or grace can there be in discharging a bankrupt when his debts are paid? You say there was grace in providing the bondsman. Granted. But when the bondsman has discharged the whole score, there is no grace in letting the debtor go. At least, there is nothing which answers to the scriptural idea of pardon.
All the popular arguments, then, which are drawn from the figure of paying debts, are not only unscriptural and of human invention, but directly opposed to the Word of God. There was nothing in the atonement of such a commercial nature. And yet the whole system which we are considering is built on the assumption that this august measure had all the attributes of a money transaction. There is only one way in which the resemblance can be at all maintained; and that is by establishing a personal identity between the representative and the represented. If this could be done, I admit that all the principles of a pecuniary payment would apply to the case. Whether, therefore, any of the arguments founded on commercial figures are at all applicable, depends on the single question of that personal identity.
Notes: 1) After the above quoted selection, Griffin goes on to discuss the correct and incorrect nature of Christ’s federal and legal union with his people. These sections are also well worth reading. 2) While one may not agree with all of Griffin’s positive theological assertions and terms, his critiques are sharp and accurate. 3) Griffin rightly challenges the notion that legal union entails a strict identity of persons, entailing a sort of “transfer” of sins to Christ, rather than the proper idea of Christ being treated as though he were a sinner (J. Edwards, C. Hodge). 4) And Griffin is exactly right to acknowledge that this confusion rests upon the conflation of the pecuniary efficacy with penal efficacy, such that Christ’s penal satisfaction obtains exactly the same sort of efficacy one finds in a pecuniary satisfaction. 5) Lastly, Griffin is exactly right that commercial categories destroy grace in the Redemption of Christ.
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