Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949) on God’s Permissive Decree

16. How does one designate God’s decree as it functions with respect to sin?

A permissive decree (decretum permissivum). This term has become accepted in Reformed dogmatics and is even found in most confessions. Our own [Belgic] Confession, on the doctrine of providence (Article 13), says, “[A]ll our enemies cannot harm us without His permission and will.”

Here and there objection is made to this distinction. Beza states it is not difficult to show that it is completely misunderstood by some, in a way that removes the devils and evil men from God’s control except that He keeps their actions and the consequences of their actions within certain limits. Nevertheless, Beza also wishes to see the terms decernius and permissivum (decreeing and permitting will) maintained, provided that they are explained correctly.

Danaeus speaks more dismissively: “From this it follows that that sophistical distinction that one is accustomed to make between God’s permission and His decree ought to be abandoned, because what happens by God’s permission happens with His will and consequently by virtue of His decree.”

a) First, it should be observed that by permissive decree the Lutherans understand something entirely negative. By it they mean that God does not decree to prevent or hinder sin by a positive act. Thus, sin itself is fully present in God’s decree as sure and certain. Concerning it God has nothing more to decide. His permissive decreeing, taken strictly, means to say that He does not decree rather than that He certainly decrees not, namely, to counter sin. This, of course, is a wrong and inadequate view. It teaches that sin has its reality and certainty from man. The former is true, as we have seen; the latter cannot be conceded. For, as for all things, so also for sin, certainty must lie in the decree of God. A permissive decree cannot be a bare budding in our spirit.

b) Others understand the permissive character of God’s decree concerning sin more in another sense, namely as follows:

God decrees in a positive manner that certain things will happen. However, sin as an unavoidable consequence adheres to these things that God decrees. Thus, if He wills these things, He must also permit sin. So, it comes down to this: God has permitted sin not for itself but because of its necessary connection with other things that He willed.

Usually this is worked out further as follows: At issue above everything was the freedom of the human will, that man, therefore, should choose for himself what he wanted, good or evil. Thus, involved as well in this freedom, in this possibility of going in either direction, was the permitting of evil, of sin.

This view is entirely unacceptable. It still makes only the possibility of sin an object of God’s decree, but not the certainty of sin. We must not only maintain that God tolerated that possibility but also that its certainty is the result of His permissive decree. It may not be thought as though God decreed to create man and then to wait on how the choice of man would turn out. That would be the Pelagian conditional decree applied to the situation of man before the fall. This view, then, is also completely at home within the orbit of Pelagian ideas.

c) There are different conceptions of God’s permissive decree that do not really pertain to the decreeing act but more to its execution and so need not be discussed here—for example, the difference between the formal and the material in sin. This is a point that has its place in the doctrine of providence and not here. Although one would see this distinction as a solution, it is of no help here, for God’s decree concerns both the formal and the material.

d) It is not possible to explain fully in a corroborating way how we are to think about God’s permissive decree. We wish, in general, to maintain the following:

1. The permissive decree is no less a certain decree than any other. Any thought as though we can speak of hesitation or uncertainty in God must be excluded by far. God is certain in everything He decrees, and for all things their certainty is secure solely in the decree of God. Also sin, in order to be certain, must be through God’s decree. The one who denies this deviates from Reformed doctrine. Just on this point lies the one great error of the church father Augustine, who wanted to make sin only an object of God’s foreknowledge but not of God’s decree. Calvin says as decisively as possible, “Man falls because God’s providence has so ordained it, but he falls by his own fault” (Institutes, 1.18.4); “I acknowledge that it is a horrible decree. Still, no one can deny that God certainly has known how it would turn out with man and that therefore He has known because he has so foreordained it in His decree.” “For the first man has fallen because the Lord judged that it ought to be so. Why He judged that remains hidden to us” (3.23.7, 8). But Calvin also lets the reverse come out, as we immediately hope to see.

2. As its object the permissive decree had sin in view as something contrary to God’s holy nature and on which His displeasure must rest. To permit something always means that it arouses my disapproval. Therefore, because on the one hand sin is against God’s holy nature, on the other hand there must have been considerations in God that nonetheless caused Him to decree to permit it. It is not granted to man to know these considerations in detail. It must be enough for us to know that through sin God knew to glorify Himself by His righteousness and His redeeming love.

3. By permitting sin in His decree God remains completely free of any wrong. Calvin: “The destruction of the godless depends on God’s decree such that the cause and nature of that destruction is to be sought in man himself.” “Through his own malevolence, man has corrupted the nature that he had received from his God.” “God could not have judged other than that man ought to fall, because He saw that thereby the honor of His name would properly come to light. And where one speaks of God’s honor, there His justice must immediately be in view, for what deserves praise, must be just.” Thus, according to Calvin, it is a just decree, both in its origin as in its content (cf. Institutes, 2.4.3–5, where Calvin goes much further than we would presume to and where in principle he rejects the permissive decree).

In the execution of this decree, too, there is nothing that can make God a cause of sin. On this point Scripture speaks as emphatically as possible. God tempts no one to evil (Jas 1:13). God is light and in Him there is no darkness (1 John 1:5). God made man upright, but they have sought out many schemes (Eccl 7:29). The Spirit of God teaches His children to praise all that is good as the work of God but also to ascribe blame for all that is evil only to themselves. This testimony of the Spirit in the believer, founded on God’s word, teaches us how this matter appears in God’s light, and we must believe it though that same light does not illumine our understanding.

Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. and trans. Richard B. Gaffin Jr., 5 vols. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2012–2016), 1:93–96.

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Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949) on Infra- and Supralapsarianism

Vos wrote:

65. Indicate beforehand what is not at issue in the difference between the two parties.

a) The question in the first place is not whether there is a temporal sequence in God’s decrees. With Scripture everyone Reformed confesses the absolute eternity of God’s being. It is an eternity elevated above all temporal duration, in which a thousand years are as yesterday when it has passed and as a watch in the night (Psa 90:4). In this eternity everything is present that is hidden in the depths of the divine mind or has ever passed over from it into time as a work of His creative omnipotence. What will happen at the consummation of the ages is in that respect not sooner than that which took place at the dawn of creation. Every conception [p 143] as if the differing parts of God’s decree arise by stages of His observation must be rejected as incompatible with this eternity. That there would have first been a decree of creation, then of the fall, and then of predestination, or that these parts would have followed one another in reverse temporal order—both are in conflict with Scripture. It may be impossible for our thinking, bound by time, to grasp this eternity of divine life; nevertheless we must acknowledge it and may maintain nothing that is in conflict with it. To express it as briefly as possible: There are in God not many decrees, but it is one, single, completely present decree.

As a matter of fact, all this is already contained in the names of supra- and infralapsarianism. If it was a matter of a temporal order it should have been called ante- and postlapsarianism. The question would then have to be, “Do you believe in predestination before or after the decree of the fall?” Now, however, not a time but a space image has been chosen, apparently to avoid every trace of a temporal conception in conflict with God’s eternity.

b) Nor is the question whether creation and the fall of man fall under the decree of God. With respect to creation, nobody doubts that. But whoever would deny that for the fall would become un-Reformed instead of infralapsarian since he would abandon one of most momentous turning points in world history, on which the work of redemption is entirely dependent and with that the course of well nigh all things, to chance. Almost all the Reformed confess unanimously with Calvin, “Man falls according to God’s decree, but he falls by his own guilt.” In His decree God has not only known of and reckoned with the fall, but since all things must have their certainty and fixity in His counsel, if we do not wish to posit a second ground of things beside God, then it also cannot be otherwise for the fearful fact of sin. That, too, must receive its certainty from God’s decree. However great and however insurmountable the difficulties that follow closely on this position, still nothing may diminish it. Whoever begins to doubt here stands on the edge of a bottomless dualism. Only in the beginning, when theological perception was not entirely clear, could one remove the fall from the absolute decree of God. Augustine did this, who thought that for the events following the [p 144] fall, God’s foreknowledge rested on His decree while, conversely, for the fall the decree was dependent on a foreseeing. This and the other point (the apostasy of the saints) were the two weak points in Augustine’s soteriology. Among truly Reformed theologians, only a few spoke of a foreseeing. Walaeus (Leiden Synopsis, xxiv, 23) says, “God, foreseeing with the infinite light of His knowledge how it would happen that man created after His image stood, together with his entire posterity, to misuse his free will, has deemed that it better accorded with His omnipotent goodness to show beneficence to the wicked, rather than not to allow there would be evil, as Augustine rightly reminds us.”

c) In the third place it needs to be pointed out that according to the Reformed, supra- as well as infralapsarians, sin stands under a permissive decree. True, some have objected to this because it reminded them too much of the Formula of Concord, article 5, and had a Lutheran ring. Calvin protested against it (Institutes, 3.23.7). After him, Beza and Danaeus. But we cannot do without this expression. It is found in strict supra- as well infralapsarians. Germanus (Opera Omnia, II, p. 28), “Therefore, the creation of men, together with permitting and controlling the fall, are means ordained to the final end of man.” And the same again and again. A permissive decree is naturally not an idle decree, a decree based on foreseeing, a decree simply not to prevent. It is a decree that brings certainty for sin as a fact and yet it is not the cause of the reality of sin. If one says that this sentence is meaningless words and distinctions, we grant that in a certain sense but at the same time point out that we are not able to get beyond them. They are beacons that we place at the edge of the unfathomable depths of mysteries.

d) The question is not whether sin comes into consideration as a factor in the decree of election and of rejection. On this point much misunderstanding reigns. One frequently hears the claim that those who place election above the fall teach that God has ordained men for eternal bliss and eternal misery only because He willed to do so and without considering their sin. But that is a conclusion that is not present in supralapsarianism and has never been intended by its advocates. With equally good right one could [p 145] derive a variety of conclusions from infralapsarianism from which everyone must recoil, since they seem to attack the foundations of God’s virtues. We will let Perkins speak here, who himself was disposed to supralapsarianism. He says, “Some accuse us of teaching that God has ordained men to hellish fire, and created them for destruction.… To this I answer in the first place that reprobation, insofar as it pertains to the first act, that is, insofar as it refers to the purpose to abandon the creature and in this to demonstrate justice, is absolute. That we teach and believe.… Sin itself occurs after the abandonment and the just permission of God.… However, reprobation, insofar as it pertains to the second act, that is, the purpose to damn, is not absolute or indefinite but it takes account of sin. For no one perishes other than by his own guilt, and no one is ordained to hell or destruction without regard to anything, but because of his own sin.… Secondly, I answer that God has not created man simply to destroy him, but so that by His just destruction of the sinner He would demonstrate His justice. For it is something quite different to will to punish man insofar as he is a sinner by a just destruction” (Of Predestination and the Grace of God, 1. 770–772).

In the same way Calvin (Institutes, 3.23) reasons by pointing on the one hand to the absolute will of God in permitting sin and emphasizing on the other hand that none of God’s creatures is ordained to destruction except insofar as he is sinful and in view of his sin. It is therefore entirely false and heinous when one attributes to supralapsarianism the concept of a so-called tyrannical God. If permitting sin is included in predestination, then two things are certainly being affirmed:

1. That it was not to make God like a tyrant for the destruction of His rational creatures as such, but for the glorification of His own virtues.

2. That God in permitting evil and in including it in predestination has not acted arbitrarily, but according to perfect justice, although we are not able to judge that justice (cf. here Calvin, Institutes, 3.23.4 and what was observed above concerning Rom 9:21). [p 146]

e) Positively we can say that the difference between the two views is:

1. A difference in the extent of predestination, since supralapsarians draw God’s decree to permit the fall within predestination, the infralapsarians leave it outside. Here we let Trigland speak (Advice Concerning the Concept of Moderation, Second Part). “I say that the teachers of the Reformed Churches, both those who place predestination above the fall as well as those who place it below the fall, certainly agree on the substance of the matter but differ only in various ways of explanation that are made of the same matter. According to Junius … ‘We do not differ from those godly and learned men who state that in predestinating God has contemplated man before he was created. Nor from those who say that man is regarded as created and fallen. For what the latter and the former say in truth, that we devoutly confess, for we say both.… When the latter say that in the predestinating of God man is considered as fallen, they do not actually have in view the cause of election and reprobation, but the order and pattern of causes from which damnation follows.… But when the former say that in predestinating God has considered man as not yet created, they do not exclude God from considering mankind’s fall.’ ” Trigland continues, “Indeed, if one pays careful attention to the matter itself in the writings of Reformed teachers, one will find that it is entirely in accord with Junius’ explanation above. As, for example, can be seen from these words of Beza, ‘Christ is presented to us as Mediator, therefore it is necessary that according to the order of causes, depravity take precedence in God’s purpose, but before depravity, creation in holiness and righteousness, so that a way would be open for God, etc.’ ”

Trigland again, “… so that I cannot see in the latter [infralapsarians] any other difference than that the former [supralapsarians] who, going before the fall, take the word predestination or foreordination somewhat more broadly, namely, for the whole decree of God concerning the entire conduct and order of salvation and damnation of men, and of all the means that are conducive to that end, both of creation as also of the permission of the fall, as well as the raising up [p 147] again of some and the forsaking of others.… But the latter who remain below the fall take the word predestination somewhat more narrowly, so that they refer the creation of man and the permission and directing of the fall, not to predestination but to God’s general providence. From this it is evident that the difference does not lie in the doctrine itself but in the explanation of the doctrine.”

2. A difference in connecting the various parts of the divine decree. The older supralapsarianism at least maintained that in God’s decree the permitting of the fall of man together with creation was subordinated to the highest end, the glorification of His justice and mercy. Thus, permitting the fall appears here as a means. Note carefully, not as a means for punishment itself but as a means for revealing God’s justice and mercy. Infralapsarianism did not maintain a connection here between means and end in this sense. It certainly acknowledged that the fall was permitted for God’s glorification, but did not dare to go further than this general proviso. It declared itself unable to explain how the fall was for God’s glorification. It let the various parts of God’s decree stand unconnected beside each other.

3. A difference in extending the personal-distinguishing character of predestination, especially of election, to include the decree of creation and the fall. The supralapsarian taught that in His decree to create God already had in view the elect as His personal beloved; likewise for the decree to permit the fall, there was not a moment in God’s counsel in which the elect stood outside this personal relationship to God of being beloved. The infralapsarian, on the other hand, thinks that the personal relationship, the distinguishing, only begins after the decrees of creation and of fall, that therefore in these two decrees the elect were included in the general mass of men and did not appear as objects of God’s special love.

One will perceive how the question whether in predestination God viewed man as still having to be created and still having to fall (creabilis et labilis), or as created and fallen (creatus et lapsus), is only a short formula for this difference. [p 148] It would perhaps be better to say creandus [to be created] et lapsurus [to be fallen] for characterizing supralapsarian sentiments. Creabilis et labilis leads to the idea that sin was not at all taken into account. “Will be created” and “will be falling” gives a sense of how sin was certainly taken into account.

66. In what respects do various supralapsarians still differ from one another?

The older supralapsarians taught that from its very outset predestination (election) was personal. God determined to create with these or those particular persons in view as His elect and beloved and likewise to permit the fall with them in view. On the other hand, later supralapsarians understood the decree at its outset less personally. So, for example, Mastricht. He distinguishes:

a) The purpose of God to reveal the glory of His mercy and His retributive justice. This is impersonal.
b) The purpose to create all men in one common root and permit them to fall in that one root. This also is impersonal.
c) The purpose to elect some specific persons and reject some specific persons out of this created and fallen humanity.
d) The purpose to prepare the means and ways fitting for carrying out the preceding decree. This is supralapsarianism for the two parts of humanity, not for specific persons.

67. In what does the distinctiveness reside of the supralapsarianism taught in “The Examination of the Concept of Tolerance” (Alexander Comrie)?

That sin accidentally becomes a transition point for a double predestination idea that lies above it and is maintained above it. Originally God predestined some to great beatitude, others to a natural state outside that beatitude (not, however, to permit sin). The former would reach that state of supernatural bliss because the Second Person of the Trinity would take on human nature and be most closely united with them in that human nature. The latter would remain outside that union. That was the pinnacle in God’s decree of predestination. Now, however, the decree appears that God will permit sin to lay hold of both these predestined groups. Thereby the predestination of the elect is changed insofar [p 149] as it becomes a predestination to save from sin and by that salvation to glorify them with Christ. A simple glorification is replaced by a glorification after antecedent redemption. At the same time the predestination of the nonelect is changed in the sense that it now becomes a decree not to leave them in their natural state but to leave them in sin and destruction.

68. What are the objections against this opinion?

a) It considers predestination as operating initially apart from redemption, while Scripture constantly brings it into connection with redemption. The entire dispensation that flows from election is a dispensation of redemption, “vessels of mercy.”

b) It necessitates positing an incarnation of Christ even apart from sin. On this point it agrees with many more recent opinions that otherwise have an entirely different origin.

c) It teaches an addition of something supernatural to nature apart from sin, which in an objectionable way calls to mind the Romish system.

69. What objection is to be made against the opinion of Mastricht?

That it lets predestination originally be impersonal and thus removes its practical and comforting element. Scripture always provides a personal representation. It says that the first act of election is already a personal love (that is, “foreknowledge”).

70. Are the logical objections against supralapsarianism conclusive?

No, because:

a) There always remain objections in such an abstract matter. We can never explain these things completely.

b) The objection that for the supralapsarian the object of predestination is a non-ens (a non-entity) rests on a misunderstanding. It is not a non-ens concerning the knowing part of God’s decree but only concerning the willing act. Also, if this reasoning is extended, God could never have made a decree of creation. [p 150]

71. Does not supralapsarianism suffer from great harshness?

We must acknowledge this. However, one should certainly keep in view that this harshness resides in the doctrine of God’s decree as such, and supralapsarianism merely brings it out clearly. Supralapsarianism teaches, for example, that God has permitted that for the glorification of his justice certain persons, through their own fault, would fall into sin in order not to be redeemed from it. The infralapsarian also says that God permits man to fall into sin for His own glorification. Now, is it so much harsher when the supralapsarian says, for the glorification of His own justice? Does something harsh become harsher by strengthening the splendor of God’s justice?

72. Can we question God’s action in this?

No, we cannot and must not attempt that. This must remain certain as it was for the apostle: It is strictly just and not tyrannically arbitrary. But on the other hand, we have no right to apply the standard of our concept of disinterested love to God’s action, as if He were not the center of all things, the highest good of everything, who can therefore also make all things subordinate to His own glory.

73. How does the Mediator figure in the decree of election?

Logically, only after sin. As Mediator He is surety. A surety presupposes a debt that must be paid. Debt presupposes sin. Christ as Mediator can only appear where sin is present. On this point one must judge as Beza does (see above in the quote of Trigland [65. e) 1.]). This must be so unless one wants to make Christ the Mediator of human nature for its glorification even in its sinless state and thus teach an incarnation apart from sin, as Comrie does. But this peculiar view does not flow from supralapsarianism as such, but from supralapsarianism connected with certain other ideas. A logical connection (nexus causalis) cannot exist between supralapsarianism and other doctrines, already simply because all the other parts of the doctrine of salvation presuppose sin.

74. Give a historical overview of the conflict between infra- and supralapsarianism.

Augustine, who first worked out the doctrine of predestination, was an infralapsarian, since he derived the fall from God’s foreknowledge. Later [p 151] the doctrine of Augustine was presented in supralapsarian terms. The presbyter Lucidus, who did this, was obliged to recant. In the Middle Ages the monk Gottschalk and Thomas Bradwardine appeared as supralapsarian defenders of predestination.

There has been dispute about Calvin. The truth is that sometimes he expressed himself in one way and at other times in another. But while his infralapsarian-sounding expressions can be explained as partial a posteriori representations, it is impossible to give a minimizing sense to his decidedly supralapsarian statements. One may compare the entire 23rd chapter of book three of his Institutes, where in connection with predestination he speaks very explicitly about the fall and the decree of the fall. Further, there is the following (Opera, IX. p. 713), “Before man was created, in His eternal decree God established what He willed would happen with the entire human race. By this secret decree of God it has happened that Adam fell from the state of his natural rectitude and by his fall drew all his posterity with himself into the guilt of eternal death.” We find more such expressions. Finally, Calvin’s declaration, “God has created us in order to redeem us.”

Among Reformed theologians after Calvin the following were supralapsarians: Beza, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Marlorat, Whitaker, Ferrius, Zanchius, Perkins, Gomarus, Maccovius (in part also, as appears from what was quoted above, Junius).

75. What has the Synod of Dordt declared regarding this issue?

It has maintained an infralapsarian position but without the intention of wanting to condemn supralapsarianism. In general one must keep in mind that an infralapsarian can never claim that what the supralapsarian says cannot be true. Were he to insist on this, he himself would have to give a positive explanation concerning the purpose of God in permitting sin. And he neither wants nor dares to enter precisely into that explanation. Therefore he says, “I keep to below the fall.” But, he does not judge the supralapsarian. At the most he could demand that the supralapsarian also leave the matter as uncertain or pass over it in silence.

That the Synod of Dordt did not wish to condemn supralapsarianism is evident from the following:

a) Not a few of its members were supralapsarians: the president, Bogerman, Gomarus, Lydius, Voetius, Festus Hommius, in [p 152]  general the delegates from Gelderland and South Holland. These all signed the Canons of Dordt. So, they would have signed their own condemnation if supralapsarianism had been condemned.

b) Gomarus protested against the recommendation of Polyander, Thysius and Walaeus, but not against the canon [concerning predestination] itself. The first mentioned of these wanted to see infralapsarianism adopted in such a way that supralapsarianism was thereby excluded. On the other hand, Gomarus did not ask that his supralapsarianism be adopted, but that the question remain open. The canon was formulated differently than the recommendation of the professors named above against whom Gomarus protested.

c) Evidently, the supralapsarians who were at Dordt did not find their complete doctrine of predestination in the canon, but still a part of it was there and they could be resigned to the other part remaining unexpressed. Gomarus had clearly not meant that his position should replace what Walaeus and the others wrote, but only that it must be added if one wished to understand the matter in depth.

d) Among the charges that were brought against Maccovius was “that he taught that the object of predestination were not fallen man.” The Synod, however, did not wish to condemn him.

e) Supralapsarianism is later taught by theologians of good repute who were considered in the Netherlands as being orthodox, namely Heidanus, Burmann, Braun, Voetius, Engelhardus, and others.

Speaking against supra- and for infralapsarianism were Polyander, Walaeus, Rivet, Cocceius, Henry Alting, Molinaeus, Fr. Spanheim, Fr.Turretin, Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Picket.

Initially the Westminster Assembly appeared to intend to adopt supralapsarianism. In the end, however, it adopted a formulation with which both views could identify. Its Prolocutor Twisse was a strong supralapsarian.

In the Netherlands Maresius firmly contended for infralapsarianism against Gomarus and Voetius. [p 153]

76. What is the difference between the infra- and supralapsarians on the doctrine of reprobation?

According to infralapsarians, reprobation has two parts: (a) praeteritio, “passing by,” God’s decree not to grant the grace of salvation to certain persons lying in sin; and (b) praedamnatio, “predamnation,” God’s decree to commit these persons to eternal destruction because of their sin.

According to the supralapsarians, reprobation has three parts: (a) the decree to set apart certain persons for the revelation of God’s retributive justice in the punishment for their sins; (b) permission in God’s decree for the fall of man; (c) the decree not to grant grace to these persons, being once fallen, but to condemn them because of their sin.

Thus, in the latter sense reprobation is God’s sovereign and just decree to ordain certain persons known to Him for the revelation of His punitive righteousness and therefore to permit them to fall into sin by their own fault and thereafter not to grant them grace in Christ.

77. Where must the infralapsarian seek the cause of reprobation?

This can be answered in three ways:

a) If one asks for the reason why just this or that particular person perishes, then the infralapsarian answers: that flows from God’s sovereign good pleasure. It cannot result from sin, for in God’s decree all Adam’s posterity is also equally subject to sin, without all being reprobate.

b) If one now asks for the reason for the withholding of grace, then from an infralapsarian standpoint the answer must again be: God’s sovereign good pleasure is the reason for this withholding. He was not obliged to grant His grace to anyone.

c) If one now asks for the reason why in general—without considering the antithesis with the elect, the reprobate perish—then for the infralapsarian the answer is that the reason did not lie in God’s predestination, but in man’s sin. If one asks further where the ground of certainty for sin lies, then the infralapsarian answers: in God’s decree. If one asks still further what moved God to permit sin, he answers: I want to stay out of that question. Someone perishes because of his sin; the certainty of the sin comes from God’s decree (although not the reality). But that God decreed to permit [p 154] his sin for glorifying His justice, the infralapsarian dare not say. Therefore he does not include it in predestination.

The supralapsarian says: The legal ground why men perish lies in sin that they deliberately commit within time. Nobody perishes other than because of his own sin. But this sin itself cannot occur apart from the permission of God’s decree. Therefore, this permission, that is, God’s predestination, is the highest ground for the reality of perishing, although not the legal ground. Naturally sin cannot be the ground for God’s decree that sin would occur. It had other grounds that we cannot fathom as far as their justness is concerned but that are nevertheless just.

78. What do we understand concerning the hardening that God causes to come upon man?

Regarding this Scripture teaches the following:

a) That generally hardening is the consequence of contact with the revelation or the truth of God against which sinful men rebels (so, for Pharaoh, Exod 7:3; Isaiah’s contemporaries, Isa 6; Matt 13:11–16). “An odor of death to death.”

b) That hardening is also caused by God simultaneously withdrawing the common grace of the Holy Spirit and permitting sin to break out and spread unhindered. Here, then, is a real act of God, but it is an act of withdrawing. God does not cause sin to arise in man but withdraws all influences that work for good. This is called, “given over to a depraved mind,” “to dishonorable passions,” “to the desires of their hearts” (Rom 1:28, 26, 24; Psa 81:13).

c) That sometimes hardening arises from resistance to extraordinary enlightenment that God has given man, but with no regenerating grace accompanying it. Something like this is indicated in Hebrews 6:4–8.

d) That becoming hardened by God can at the same time be called the hardening of oneself. That is said of Pharaoh.

79. Is Christ the meriting cause of election?

No, this would imply that the gift of Christ preceded election and so was generally intended for all mankind. One says, God cannot condescend [p 155] to grant election to a sinful humanity if Christ is not already there as Mediator. We answer, He also cannot condescend to a sinful humanity with the gift of a mediator if the mediator is not already there. And so one never reaches a conclusion.

Turretin says, “The question is not whether Christ is the foundation and the meriting cause of a decreed salvation with respect to its matter but whether Christ is the meriting cause and the foundation of the decree of salvation with respect to God. The first question must be answered affirmatively, the second negatively. Everything that in reality comes to us flows from Christ, but Christ Himself, with all that flows from Him, has been given to us out of the free mercy of God. Scripture speaks this way everywhere (1 Cor 1:30).”

Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. and trans. Richard B. Gaffin Jr., 5 vols. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2012–2016), 1:142–155.

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Note: Some of Vos’s historical and theological claims should be taken with caution.

Original post here (click).

John Owen (1616–1683) on Christ Suffering the Idem, Not the Tantundem of the Law’s Punishment

Owen wrote:

1)

Now from all this, thus much (to clear up the nature of the satisfaction made by Christ) appeareth,—namely, It was a full, valuable compensation, made to the justice of God, for all the sins of all those for whom he made satisfaction, by undergoing that same punishment which, by reason of the obligation that was upon them, they themselves were bound to undergo. When I say the same, I mean essentially the same in weight and pressure, though not in all accidents of duration and the like; for it was impossible that he should be detained by death. Now, whether this will stand in the justice of God, that any of these should perish eternally for whom Jesus Christ made so full, perfect, and complete satisfaction, we shall presently inquire; and this is the first thing that we are to consider in this business.

John Owen, “Salus Electorum, Sanguis Jesu; Or, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ,” in The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold, 17 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862), 10:269–70.

2)

MR. BAXTER having composed his Aphorisms of Justification, with their explications, before the publishing of them in print, he communicated them (as should appear) to some of his near acquaintance. Unto some things in them contained one of his said friends gives in some exceptions. Amongst other things he opposed unto those aphorisms, he also points at my contrary judgment in one or two particulars, with my reasons produced for the confirmation thereof. This provoketh their learned author (though unwilling) to turn aside to the consideration of those reasons. Now, the first of those particulars being about the payment made for sin in the blood of Christ, of what sort and kind it is, I shall willingly carry on the inquiry to this farther issue, whereunto I am drawn out.

1. He looks upon the stating of the question as I professedly laid it down at my entrance into that disputation, and declares that it is nothing at all to the question he hath in hand, nor looking that way.

“He distinguisheth,” saith Mr. Baxter, “betwixt paying the very thing that is in the obligation and paying so much in another kind; now, this is not our question, nor any thing to it,” Append. p. 137.

If it be so, I know no reason why I was plucked into the following dispute, nor why Mr. Baxter should cast away so many pages of his book upon that which is nothing at all to the business he had in hand. But though there be nothing to this purpose, p. 137 [265; The figures in brackets indicate where the passages are to be found in the present volume.—ED.] of my book, the place he was sent to, yet, p. 140 [267], there is, as also something contrary to what is expressed in the former place, which he intimates in these words:—

“In p. 140 [267] he states the question far otherwise, and yet supposeth it the same, namely,—Whether Christ paid the idem or the tantundem? which he interpreteth thus, ‘That which is not the same, nor equivalent unto it, but only in the gracious acceptation of the creditor.’ Now, what he means by ‘not equivalent’ I cannot tell.

“If he mean, not of equal value, then he fights with a shadow. He wrongeth Grotius, for aught I can find in him, who teacheth no such doctrine. However, I do not so use to English solutio tantidem. But if he mean, that it is not equivalent in procuring its end ipso facto, delivering the debtor, without the intervention of a new concession or contract of the creditor, as solutio ejusdem doth, then I confess Grotius is against him, and so am I.

“So, also, God’s gracious acceptance is either in accepting less in value than was due, and so remitting the rest without payment (this I plead not for); or else it is his accepting a refusable payment, which, though equal in value, yet he may choose to accept according to the tenor of the obligation. This is gracious acceptance, which Grotius maintaineth, and so do I; and so distinguish betwixt solutio and satisfactio, ‘payment’ and ‘satisfaction.’ ” Thus far he.

Sundry things are here imagined and asserted:—First, Several passages are pointed at in my treatise, and a contradiction between them intimated. Secondly, Various conjectures given at my plain, very plain meaning, and divers things objected answerable to those conjectures, etc.

Wherefore, to clear the whole, I shall,—1. Give you in the passages opposed; and, 2. Vindicate them from mutual opposition, with what is besides charged on them.

The first place mentioned in my treatise is in p. 137 [265], where, after I had discoursed of the nature of satisfaction, in reference both unto things real and personal, I laid down a distinction in these words:—

“There may be a twofold satisfaction,—First, By a solution or payment of the very thing that is in the obligation, either by the party himself who is bound, or by some other in his stead; as, if I owe a man twenty pounds, and my friend goeth and payeth it, my creditor is fully satisfied. Secondly, By a solution or paying of so much, although in another kind, not the same that is in the obligation, which by the creditor’s acceptation stands in lieu of it; upon which also freedom followeth from the obligation, by virtue of an act of favour.” What now says Mr. B. to this? Why, “it is nothing to the business he hath in hand.”

Let then this pass, and look to the next passage which is opposed, and supposed to stand in opposition to the other.

Having laid down the former distinction, passing on to some other things concerning the nature of satisfaction, and the establishment of that of Christ from the Scripture, in p. 140 [267], I apply that distinction laid down before in general to the kind of satisfaction made by Christ, in these words:—

“Whereas I said that there is a twofold satisfaction whereby the debtor is freed from the obligation that is upon him,—the one being solutio ejusdem, payment of the same thing that was in the obligation; the other solutio tantidem, of that which is not the same, nor equivalent unto it, but only in the gracious acceptation of the creditor,—it is worth our inquiry which of these it was that our Saviour did perform.” And accordingly I refer it to the first.

“This,” saith Mr. B., “is a stating of the question far otherwise than before, yet supposing it the same.”

But this I was so far from once mistrusting before, as that, being informed of it, I cannot as yet apprehend it to be so.

In p. 137 [265] I lay down a distinction in general about the several kinds of satisfaction, which, p. 140 [267], I plainly apply to the satisfaction of Christ, without any new, much less changed stating of the question. My whole aim, in that inquiry, was to search out that kind of punishment which Christ underwent in making satisfaction for sin,—namely, “Whether it were the same that was threatened to the transgressors themselves, or whether something else which God accepted in lieu thereof, relaxing the law not only as to the person suffering, but also as to the penalty to be undergone?”

The first of these, and that with the concurrent suffrage of far the greatest number of protestant divines, I assert with sundry arguments, pp. 141, 142, etc., 154–156 [268, etc., 280–282]. Unto which assertion he neither opposeth himself nor once attempteth to answer any of the arguments whereby I proved it.

This being my intendment, p. 137 [285], I intimate that Christ paid the same thing that was in the obligation; as if, in things real, a friend should pay twenty pounds for him that owed so much, and not any thing in another kind. And p. 140 [267], I affirm that he paid idem, that is, the same thing that was in the obligation, and not tantundem, something equivalent thereunto, in another kind.

“The first of these is nothing to our purpose,” saith Mr. B., “but the latter crossing the former.”

But truly, such is my dullness, I cannot as yet be won to his mind herein. But I agree with myself; perhaps I do not with the truth. That description of solutio tantidem, namely, that it is a payment of that which is not the same, nor equivalent unto it, but only in the gracious acceptation of the creditor, is peculiarly opposed.

To make this expression obnoxious to an exception, Mr. B. divides it, that so it may be entangled with a fallacy, παρὰ τῶν πλείων ἐρωτημάτων. And, first, he asks as before what I mean by not equivalent; and hereunto supposing two answers, to the first he opposeth a shadow, to the latter himself.

First, “If,” saith he, “by not equivalent, you mean not of equal value, you fight with a shadow, and wrong Grotius. However, I do not use so to English solutio tantidem.”

By not equivalent, I mean that which is not of equal value, or certainly I mistook the word; and if so, had need enough to have gone to Mr. B., or some other learned man, to have learned to English solutio tantidem. But do I not, then, right with a shadow? Truly, cut my words thus off in the middle of their sense, and they will be found fit to cope with no other adversary; but take them as they lie, and as intended, and there is scarce any shadow of opposition to them cast by Mr. B. passing by. My words are, “It is not equivalent, but only in the gracious acceptation of the creditor.” Is not this the plain meaning of these words, that tantundem in satisfaction is not equivalent to idem ἁπλῶς, but only κατὰ τί? What is denied of it absolutely is affirmed in some respect. He that says it is not equivalent but only in gracious acceptation, in that sense affirms it to be equivalent, and that it is in respect of that sense that the thing so called is said to be tantundem, that is, equivalent.

Now, what excepts Mr. B. hereunto? Doth he assert tantundem to be in this matter equivalent unto idem ἁπλῶς? It is the very thing he opposeth all along, maintaining that solutio tantidem stands in need of gracious acceptance, ejusdem of none; and, therefore, they are not as to their end ἁπλῶς, equivalent. Or will he deny it to be equivalent in God’s gracious acceptance? This he also contendeth for himself: “Though refusable, yet equivalent.” What, then, is my crime? I wrong Grotius! Wherein? In imposing on him that he should say, “It was not of equal value to the idem that Christ paid.” Not one such word in any of the places mentioned. I say, Grotius maintains that the satisfaction of Christ was solutio tantidem. Will you deny it? Is it not his main endeavour to prove it so? Again; tantundem, I say, is not in this case equivalent to idem ἁπλῶς, but only κατὰ τί. Doth not Mr. B. labour to prove the same? Where, then, is the difference? Were it not for Ignoratio elenchi in the bottom, and Fallacia plurium interrogationum at the top, this discourse would have been very empty.

Secondly. But he casts my words into another frame, to give their sense another appearance, and saith,—

“If you mean that it is not equivalent in procuring its end ipso facto, delivering the debtor without the intervention of a new concession or contract of the creditor, as solutio ejusdem doth, then I confess Grotius is against you, and so am I.”

Of Grotius I shall speak afterward; for the present I apply myself to Mr. B., and say,—

1. If he intend to oppose himself to any thing I handle and assert in the place he considereth, he doth, by this query, plainly μεταζαίνειν εἰς τὸ ἄλλο γένος, and that from a second inadvertency of the argument in hand. It is of the nature of the penalty undergone, and not of the efficacy of the satisfaction made thereby, that I there dispute.

2. I conceive that in this interrogation and answer he wholly gives up the cause that he pretends to plead, and joins with me, as he conceives my sense to be, against Grotius and himself. “If,” saith he, “he mean that it is not equivalent in procuring its end ipso facto, without the intervention of a new concession or contract, as solutio ejusdem doth, then I am against him.” Well, then, Mr. B. maintains that solutio tantidem is equivalent with solutio ejusdem in obtaining its end ipso facto; for, saith he, if I say it is not equivalent, he is against me. Τὸ σὸν ὄναρ σοὶ διηγοῦμαι. But is this his mind indeed? Will his words bear any other sense?

3. Whether tantundem and idem, in the way of satisfaction, be equivalent to the obtaining the end ipso facto aimed at, which he here asserts, though elsewhere constantly denies,—couching in this distinction the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of a great part of his discourse,—certainly it is nothing at all to the question I there agitated, maintaining that it was idem, and not tantundem, that Christ paid, and so the end of it obtained ipso facto answerable to the kind of the efficacy and procurement thereof.

But perhaps I do not conceive his mind aright; peradventure his mind is, that if I do maintain the satisfaction of Christ to procure the end aimed at, ipso facto, as solutio ejusdem would have done, then to profess himself my adversary. But,—

1. This is not here expressed nor intimated.
2. It is nothing at all to me who place the matter of the satisfaction of Christ in solutione ejusdem.
3. About the end of satisfaction in the place opposed I speak not, but only of the nature of the penalty undergone, whereby it was made.
4. To the thing itself, I desire to inquire,—

(1.) What Mr. B. intends by solutio ejusdem in the business in hand? Doth he not maintain it to be the offender’s own undergoing the penalty of the law? What end, I pray, doth this obtain ipso facto? Can it be any other but the glory of God’s justice in the everlasting destruction of the creature? How, then, can it possibly be supposed to attain the end spoken of ipso facto? If this be the only meaning of solutio ejusdem, in this sense, the end of it is distant from the end of satisfaction ὡς οὐρανός ἐστʼ ἀπὸ γαίας. By the laying the penalty on Christ, that God intended the freedom of those for whom he underwent that penalty, I suppose cannot be doubted; but in inflicting it on the offenders themselves, that he hath any such aim, wants an Origen to assert.

(2.) Whether the penalty due to one may not be undergone by another? and if so, whether it be not the same penalty, the idem, or no? In things real I gave an instance before. If a man pay twenty pounds for another who owed it, doth not he pay the idem in the obligation? And may not this hold in things personal also?

Of the satisfaction of Christ procuring its end ipso facto, I mean in its own kind,—for the death of Christ must be considered as meritorious as well as satisfactory, if the deliverance be attended as the end of it,—I shall speak afterward in its proper place. The present controversy is no more but this:—

Whether Christ underwent the penalty threatened unto us, or some other thing accepted instead thereof, by a new constitution? or, which is all one, whether, in laying our iniquities upon Christ, the law of God was relaxed only as to the persons suffering, or also as to the penalty suffered? that is, whether Christ paid the idem in the obligation, or tantundem?

To suppose that the idem of the obligation is not only the penalty itself, but also the offender’s own suffering that penalty, and then to inquire whether Christ underwent the idem, is to cause an easy enemy to triumph in his dejection.

That the law was relaxed as to the person suffering, I positively assert; but as to the penalty itself, that is not mentioned. Of these two things alone, then, must be our inquiry:—

1. Whether Christ, in making satisfaction, underwent that penalty that was threatened to the offenders themselves?
2. Whether the penalty, though undergone by another, be not the idem of the obligation?

Of both these, after the clearing of the residue of Mr. Baxter’s exceptions.

Nextly, he requireth what I intend by “gracious acceptance,” or rather giveth in his own sense of it in these words, pp. 138, 139 [266, 267]:—“So also God’s gracious acceptance is either his accepting less in value than was due, and so remitting the rest without payment. This I plead not for. Or else it is his accepting of a refusable payment, which, though equal in value, yet he may choose to accept according to the tenor of the obligation. This is gracious acceptance, which Grotius maintaineth, and so do I.” Thus far he.

Now, neither is this any more to the business I have in hand; for,—

1. The value of any satisfaction in this business ariseth not from the innate worth of the things whereby it is made, but purely from God’s free constitution of them to such an end. A distinction cannot be allowed of more or less value in the things appointed of God for the same end; all their value ariseth merely from that appointment; they have so much as he ascribeth to them, and no more. Now, neither idem nor tantundem is here satisfactory, but by virtue of divine constitution. Only, in tantundem I require a peculiar acceptance, to make it equivalent to idem in this business,—that is, as to satisfaction; or, if you please, an acceptance of that which is not idem, to make it tantundem. So that this gracious acceptance is not an accepting of that which is less in value than what is in the obligation, but a free constitution appointing another thing to the end, which before was not appointed.

2. He supposeth me (if in so many mistakes of his I mistake him not) to deny all gracious acceptance where the idem is paid; [which], in the present case, is to assert it necessary, because not paid per eundem; yea, and that other person not procured by the debtor, but graciously assigned by the creditor.

3. To make up his gracious acceptance in this latter sense, he distinguisheth of payments refusable and not refusable: in the application of which distinction unto the payment made by Christ I cannot close with him; for a payment is refusable either absolutely and in itself, or upon supposal. The death of Christ, considered absolutely and in itself, may be said to be refusable as to be made a payment,—not a refusable payment; and that not because not refusable, but because not a payment. Nothing can possibly tend to the procurement and compassing of any end, by the way of payment, with the Lord, but what is built upon some free compact, promise, or obligation of his own. But now consider it as an issue flowing from divine constitution making it a payment, and so it was no way refusable as to the compassing of the end appointed. Thus, also, as to the obligation of the law for the fulfilling thereof, it was refusable in respect of the person paying, not in respect of the payment made. That former respect being also taken off by divine constitution, and relaxation of the law as to that, it becometh wholly unrefusable,—that is, as it was paid, it was so; for satisfaction was made thereby, upon the former supposals of constitution and relaxation.

4. Doth not Mr. B. suppose that in the very tenor of the obligation there is required a solution, tending to the same end as satisfaction doth? Nay, is not that ἀζλεψία the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of this discourse? Deliverance is the aim of satisfaction, which receives its spring and being from the constitution thereof; but is there any such thing as deliverance once aimed at or intended in the tenor of the obligation? I suppose no.

5. Neither is the distinction of solutio and satisfactio, which Mr. B. closeth withal, of any weight in this business, unless it would hold ὅλως καὶ πάντως, which it will not, and so is of no use here; for,—

(1.) There is solutio tantidem as well as ejusdem, and therein consists satisfaction, according to Mr. B.

(2.) Whether satisfaction be inconsistent with solutio ejusdem, but not per eundem, is the τὸ κρινόμενον. After all this Mr. B. adds,— “Yet here Mr. Owen enters the list with Grotius.”

Where, I pray? I might very justly make inquiry, from the beginning to the ending of this discourse, to find out what it is that this word “here” particularly answereth unto. But to avoid as much as possible all strife of words, I desire the reader to view the controversy agitated between Grotius and myself, not as here represented by Mr. Baxter, so changed by a new dress that I might justly refuse to take any acquaintance with it, but as by myself laid down in the places excepted against, and he will quickly find it to be.—

1. Not whether the law were at all relaxed, but whether it were relaxed as well in respect of the penalty to be suffered as of the person suffering; that is, whether God be only a rector, or a rector and creditor also, in this business. Which controversy, by the way, is so confusedly proposed, or rather strangely handled by Mr. B., p. 145, where he adjudges me in a successless assault of Grotius, as makes it evident he never once perused it.

2. Nor, secondly, whether there be any need of God’s gracious acceptance in this business or no; for I assert it necessary, as before described, in reference to solutio ejusdem, sed non per eundem.

3. Neither, thirdly, whether the satisfaction of Christ, considered absolutely, and in statu diviso, and materially, be refutable, which I considered not; or be unrefusable, supposing the divine constitution which Grotius, as I take it, delivered not himself in. Nor,—

4. About the value of the payment of Christ in reference to acceptance; but merely, as I said before, whether the Lord, appointing an end of deliverance neither intimated nor couched in the obligation nor any of its attendancies, constituting a way for the attainment of that end by receiving satisfaction to the obligation, did appoint that the thing in the obligation should be paid, though by another, or else some new thing, that of itself and by itself never was in the obligation, either before or after its solution; as the payment made by Christ must be granted such, unless it were for substance the same which the law required. And here, with most divines, I maintain the first.—namely, That the law was relaxed in respect of the person suffering, but executed in respect of the penalty suffered. Relaxation and execution are not in this business opposed ἁπλῶς, but only κατὰ τί.

He that would see this farther affirmed may consult what I wrote of it in the place opposed; which is not once moved by any thing here spoken to the contrary.

By the way observe, I speak only of the penalty of the law, and the passive righteousness of Christ, strictly so called. For his active righteousness, or obedience to the law (though he did many things we were not obliged unto, for the manifestation of himself, and confirmation of the doctrine of the gospel), that it was the very idem of us required, I suppose none can doubt. What place that active righteousness of Christ hath, or what is its use in our justification, I do not now inquire, being unwilling to immix myself unnecessarily in any controversy; though I cannot but suppose that Mr. B.’s discourse hereabouts gives advantage enough even minorum gentium theologies, “to ordinary divines,” as he calls them, to deal with him in it.

John Owen, “The Death of Christ, the Price He Paid, and the Purchase He Made,” in The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold, 17 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862), 10:437–42.

3)

The arguments of Grotius, and their defence by Mr. Baxter, about the penalty undergone by Christ in making satisfaction, considered

The state of the question in hand being as above laid down, let us now see what Mr. Baxter’s judgment is of my success in that undertaking, concerning which he thus delivereth himself: “Yet here Mr. Owen enters the list with Grotius.” And,—

First, “He overlooketh his greatest arguments.”

Secondly, “He slightly answereth only two.”

Thirdly, “And when he hath done, he saith as Grotius doth, and yieldeth the whole cause. These three things I will make appear in order,” Appendix, p. 139.

A most unhappy issue as can possibly be imagined, made up of deceit, weakness, and self-contradiction! But how is all this proved? To make the first thing appear, he produceth the argument overlooked.

“The chief argument of Grotius and Vossius,” saith he, “is drawn from the tenor of the obligation and from the event. The obligation chargeth punishment on the offender himself. It saith, ‘In the day thou eatest, thou shalt die;’ and, ‘Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things,’ etc. Now, if the same in the obligation be paid, then the law is executed, and not relaxed, and then every sinner must die himself; for that is the idem and very thing threatened: so that here dum alius solvit, simud aliud solvitur. The law threatened not Christ, but us (besides that Christ suffered not the loss of God’s love, nor his image and graces, nor eternity of torment; of which I have spoken in the treatise.) What saith Mr. Owen to any of this?”

Let the reader observe what it is we have in hand. It is not the main of the controversy debated by Grotius wherein I do oppose him, neither yet all in that particular whereabout the opposition is. Now suppose, as he doth, that the punishing of the person offending is in the obligation, yet I cannot but conceive that there be two distinct things here,—first, The constitution of the penalty itself to be undergone; secondly, The terminating of this penalty upon the person offending. For this latter I assert a relaxation of the law; which might be done and yet the penalty itself in reference to its constitution be established. In those places, then, ‘In the day thou eatest,’ etc., there is death and the curse appointed for the penalty, and the person offending appointed for the sufferer. That the law is relaxed in the latter I grant. That the former was executed on Christ I prove. Now, what says this argument to the contrary?

“If the same in the obligation be paid, then the law is executed, not relaxed, and then every sinner must die himself; for that is the idem and very thing threatened: so that here dum alias solvit, aliud solvitur.”

1. The matter of the obligation having a double consideration, as before, it may be both executed and relaxed in sundry respects.

2. The idem and very thing threatened in the constitution of the law is death. The terminating of that penalty to the person offending was in the commination, and had it not been relaxed, must have been in the execution; but in the constitution of the obligation, which respects purely the kind of penalty, primarily it was not. “Death is the reward of sin,” is all that is there.

3. We inquire not about payment, but suffering. To make that suffering a payment supposeth another constitution, by virtue whereof Christ suffering the same that was threatened, it became another thing in payment than it would have been if the person offending had suffered himself.

4. That the law threatened not Christ but us is most true; but the question is, whether Christ underwent not the threatening of the law, not we? A commutation of persons is allowed, Christ undergoing the penalty of the offence; though he were not the person offending, I cannot but still suppose that he paid the idem of the obligation.

5. For the parenthesis about Christ’s not suffering the loss of God’s love, etc., and the like objections, they have been answered near a thousand times already, and that by “no ordinary divines” neither; so that I shall not farther trouble any therewith.

Now, this is the argument, the great, chief argument, of Grotius and Vossius, which Mr. Baxter affirms I overlooked.

That I did not express it I easily grant, neither will I so wrong the ingenuous reader as to make any long apology for my omission of it, considering the state of the matter in difference as before proposed. When Mr. B. or any man else shall be able to draw out any conclusion from thence, “That, granting the relaxation of the law as to the persons suffering, the Lord Christ did not undergo the penalty constituted therein;” or that, “Undergoing the very penalty appointed, he did not pay the idem in the obligation” (supposing a new constitution for the converting of suffering into a satisfactory payment), I shall then give a reason why I considered it not.

Owen, “The Death of Christ,” Works, 10:442–44.

4)

My second answer to that objection I gave in these words:—

2. “That remission, grace, and pardon, which is in God for sinners, is not opposed to Christ’s merits and satisfaction, but ours. He pardoneth all to us, but he spared not his only Son; he bated him not one farthing.”

To this Mr. B., thus expressing it, “But it is of grace to us, though not to Christ,” answereth, “Doth not that clearly intimate that Christ was not in the obligation, that the law doth threaten every man personally, or else it had been no favour to accept it of another?”

(1.) It is marvellous to me, that a learned man should voluntarily choose an adversary to himself, and yet consider the very leaves which he undertakes to confute with so much contempt or oscitancy as to labour to prove against him what he positively asserts terminis terminantibus. That Christ was not in the obligation, that he was put in as a surety by his own consent, God by his sovereignty dispensing with the law as to that, yet as a creditor exacting of him the due debt of the law, is the main intendment of the place Mr. Baxter here considereth.

(2.) Grant all that here is said, how doth it prove that Christ underwent not the very penalty of the law? Is it because he was not primarily in the obligation? He was put in as a surety, to be the object of its execution. Is it because the law doth threaten every man personally? Christ underwent really what was threatened to others, as shall be proved. But it is not then of favour to accept it. But this is the τὸ κρινόμενον. And thus to set it down is but a petition τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

(3.) How doth this elude the force of my answer? I see it not at all.

After this I gave a third answer to the former objection, manifesting how the freedom of pardon may consist with Christ’s satisfaction, in these words:—

3. “The freedom, then, of pardon hath not its foundation in any defect of the merit or satisfaction of Christ, but in three other things:—

(1.) “The will of God freely appointing the satisfaction of Christ, John 3:16; Rom. 5:8; 1 John 4:9.

(2.) “In a gracious acceptation of that decreed satisfaction in our steads; so many, no more.

(3.) “In a free application of the death of Christ unto us. Remission, then, excludes not a full satisfaction by the solution of the very thing in the obligation, but only the solution or satisfaction of him to whom pardon and remission is granted.”

It being the freedom of pardon that is denied, upon the supposals of such a satisfaction as I assert, I demonstrate from whence that freedom doth accrue unto it, notwithstanding a supposal of such a satisfaction: not that pardon consisteth in the three things there recounted, but that it hath its freedom from them; that is, supposing those three things, notwithstanding the intervention of payment made by Christ, it cannot be but remission of sin unto us be a free and gracious act.

To all this Mr. B. opposeth divers things; for,—

1. “Imputation of righteousness,” saith he, “is not any part of pardon, but a necessary antecedent.
2. “The same may be said of God’s acceptation.
3. “Its application is a large phrase, and may be meant of several acts, but of which here I know not.”

In a word, this mistake is very great. I affirm the freedom of a pardon to depend on those things. He answereth that pardon doth not consist in these things. It is the freedom of pardon, whence it is,—not the nature of pardon, wherein it is, that we have under consideration. “But,” saith he, “how can he call it a ‘gracious acceptation,’ a ‘gracious imputation,’ a ‘free application,’ if it were the same thing the law requireth that was paid?

“To pay all, according to the full exaction of the obligation, needeth no favour to procure acceptance, imputation, or application. Can justice refuse to accept of such a payment? or can it require any more?”

1. Though I know not directly what it is he means by saying, “I call it,” yet I pass it over.

2. If all this were done by the persons themselves, or any one in their stead procured and appointed by themselves, then were there some difficulty in these questions; but this being otherwise, there is none at all, as hath been declared.

3. How the payment made by Christ was of grace, yet in respect of the obligation of the law needed no favour, nor was refusable by justice, supposing its free constitution, shall be afterward declared. To me the author seems not to have his wonted clearness in this whole section, which might administer occasion of farther inquiry and exceptions, but I forbear.

And thus much be spoken for the clearing and vindicating my answer to the arguments of Grotius against Christ’s paying the idem of the obligation. The next shall farther confirm the truth.

Owen, “The Death of Christ,” in Works, 10:444–46.

5)

4. The whole penalty of sin is death. Gen. 2:17, This Christ underwent for us: Heb. 2:9, “He tasted death.” And to die for another is to undergo that death which that other should have undergone, 2 Sam. 18:33. It is true, this death may be considered either in respect of its essence (if I may be allowed so to speak), which is called the “pains of hell,” which Christ underwent, Ps. 116:3, 22:1, Luke 22:44; or of its attendancies, as duration and the like, which he could not undergo, Ps. 16:8–11, Acts 2:24–28. So that whereas eternal death may be considered two ways, either as such in potentia, and in its own nature, or as actually, so our Saviour underwent, it not in the latter, but first sense, Heb. 2:9, 14, which, by the dignity of his person, 1 Pet. 3:18, Heb. 9:26, 28, Rom. 5:10, which raises the estimation of punishment, is equipotent to the other. There is a sameness in Christ’s sufferings with that in the obligation in respect of essence, and equivalency in respect of attendancies.

5. In the meeting of our iniquities upon Christ, Isa. 53:6, and his being thereby made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5:21, lay the very punishment of our sin, as to us threatened, upon him.

6. Consider the scriptural descriptions you have of his perpessions, and see if they do not plainly hold out the utmost that ever was threatened to sin. There is the הֲבירָה, Isa. 53:5; Peter’s μώλωψ, 1 Pet. 2:24; the “livor, vibex,” “wound, stripe,” that in our stead was so on him,—that whereby we are healed. Those expressions of the condition of his soul in his sufferings, whereby he is said λυπεῖσθαι, Matt. 26:37; ἐκθαμζεῖσθαι, ἀδημονεῖν, Mark 14:33; θρόμζοι αἵματος ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ, Luke 22:44; sadness unto death, Matt. 26:38; that dreadful cry, “Why hast thou forsaken me?”—those cries out of the deep, and mighty supplications under his fear, Heb. 5:7, that was upon him, do all make out that the bitterness of the death due to sin was fully upon his soul. Sum all his outward appearing pressures, mocks, scoffs, scorns, cross, wounds, death, etc., and what do some of their afflictions who have suffered for his name come short of it? And yet how far were they above those dreadful expressions of anguish which we find upon the “Fellow of the Lord of hosts,” the “Lion of the tribe of Judah,” who received not the Spirit by measure, but was anointed with the oil of gladness above his fellows! Certainly his inconceivable sufferings were in another kind, and such as set no example to any of his to suffer in after him. It was no less than the weight of the wrath of God and the whole punishment due to sin that he wrestled under.

Secondly, The second part of my position is to me confirmed by these and the like arguments.

That there is a distinction to be allowed between the penalty and the person suffering is a common apprehension, especially when the nature of the penalty is only inquired after. If a man that had but one eye were censured to have an eye put out, and a dear friend, pitying his deplorable condition, knowing that by undergoing the punishing decreed he must be left to utter blindness, should, upon the allowance of commutation, as in Zaleucus’ case, submit to have one of his own eyes put out, and so satisfy the sentence given, though, by having two eyes, he avoid himself the misery that would have attended the other’s suffering, who had but one;—if, I say, in this case, any should ask whether he underwent the idem the other should have done, or tantundem, I suppose the answer would be easy. In things real, it is unquestionable; and in things personal I shall pursue it no farther, lest it should prove a strife of words. And thus far of the sufferings of Christ in a way of controversy. What follows will be more positive.

Owen, “The Death of Christ,” in Works, 10:448–49.

Notes: The above are selections from Owen on whether or not Christ suffered the idem or the tantundem of the law’s curse against sin and sinners. A few things to keep in mind. (1) As I read Owen, he concedes that it is not the case that Grotius believed that Christ’s suffering were of lesser value, contrary to our current popular myth regarding Grotius. (2) Note that, Owen wraps his response to Baxter’s counters to Owen, around the charge that if Christ suffered the tantundem of the law’s curse, his suffering was of lesser value, which God freely accepted. I am not convinced that Baxter means this. (3) Owen rightly believed that the law’s demands are relaxed in this sense: that another person is allowed to make a payment on behalf of third party transgressors. (4) Owen clearly believed that Christ suffered the same exact idem of the law’s demands that stands against (elect) sinners, whereas the Reformed position was that this was not so, but that Christ suffered the tantundem, an equivalent of equal or more value (not lesser), of the law’s demands. (5) Owen argued this because he saw that the punishment of death, itself, [is] the essential satisfaction of the law. The duration of death is an accidental property of legal satisfaction. That is, how long one is kept in death is not essential. The consequences of this would be that eternal punishment is not an essential demand of the law against sin, but that merely physical death is. For the Reformed, however, eternal punishment is part of the essential requirement for the satisfaction of the law against sin, as eternal punishment has the equivalency of an “infinite” value corresponding with the infinite value of the demerit of sin. Christ, being an infinite person, thereby properly equals the value of infinite demerit. Owen, reacting to the Socinian claim that Christ suffered a lesser satisfaction than the law would demand from sinners, over-reacts by positing that Christ suffered the very idem of the law’s demands against sinners, namely mere death itself. In this Owen is moving away from Reformed theology and laying down the foundation for later Crispian ideas that Christ suffered so much for so much sin, and which began to see the satisfaction as having an exact mathematical (and/or pecuniary) correspondence. These ideas were later picked up by some Welsh hypercalvinist Baptists (See Owen Thomas, The Atonement Controversy: In Welsh Theological Literature and Debate, 1707–1841), later hypercalvinists (W. J. Styles), and even by John L. Dagg. (6) In traditional Anselmian Christology, only an infinite and sinless person can satisfy divine justice, yet given Owen’s assumptions here, I am not sure how he would defend the possible counter that on his model, only a sinless person is needed to satisfy divine justice. (7) Lastly, the above is not for the faint hearted.

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John Gibbon (1629–1718) on Death of Christ: Penal Not Pecuniary and Tantundem Not Idem

Now, to pluck up all these desperate consequences by the root, there needs no more than a right understanding of the true and proper notion and manner of Christ’s redeeming us. It is not by way of solution, but of satisfaction. Clearly thus:—our case to God is not properly that of debtors, but that of criminal subjects. God’s aspect to us-ward [is] not properly that of a creditor, but that of a Rector and Judge. The person [which] Christ sustained, and the part [that] he acted, [was] not, in a strict sense, that of a Surety, paying the wry debt in kind, and so discharging a bond; but that of a Mediator, expiating our guilt and making reparations to Divine Justice [in] another way than by the execution of the law; And, indeed, the very nature of a law is such, as [that] it is quite impossible that the obligation either of its threatening or command should in a proper sense be fulfilled by any other than the very person threatened and commanded: alius here makes aliud. If another suffer the penalty, the threatening is not fulfilled; nor, if another performs the duty, [is] the command [fulfilled]: for, “the obligation as to punishment lies on the person threatened;” (noxa caput sequitur); and that to duty, on the person commanded. It cannot be fulfilled in kind by “another,” but it ceases to be the same thing, and becomes “another thing” from that in the obligation: yet it may be such another thing (and Christ’s righteousness, both active and passive, really is such) as the rector or judge may accept of with honour and be satisfied with, as if the very same thing had been suffered and done just in the same manner as the law threatened and commanded it.

That Christ has paid, not the idem, but tantundem,—that is, not fulfilled the law (as for us) in kind, but satisfied it for us,—is most evident. For,

(1.) The law obliged the sinner’s person to suffer: Christ was no sinner.

(2.) All men to suffer; forasmuch as “all had sinned”: Christ was but one man.

(3.) The punishment due by law was eternal: Christ suffered but for a season, and is “entered into his glory.” (Luke xxiv. 26.) Thus Christ paid not the same thing that was in the obligation, but something equivalent thereunto.

This being obtained,—that the Lord Christ has redeemed us, not by way of solution, or discharging a bond by payment in kind; but by way of satisfaction, or making amends to the injured justice of the law,—it follows, from the reason and nature of the thing,

(1.) That God pardon freely.—We are not only beholden to Christ for satisfying, but to God, too, infinitely for accepting of any satisfaction at all. He might have refused it: he had done sinners no wrong, if he had executed the rigour of the law, without hearkening to terms of reconciliation. Quite contrary: a creditor does not pardon the debtor, when the surety has discharged the bond by full payment in kind: the debtor is beholden, indeed, to his friend the surety, but not at all to the creditor, who cannot refuse to cancel the bond; nay, it were wrong and injustice in him if he did.

(2.) That none has or can have actual interest in, or benefit by, this redemption, but upon such terms as God and Christ have mutually compromised in and agreed to; namely, the condition of the gospel covenant above-mentioned.—See the answer to the third query.

(i.) The reason hereof is partly from God, the injured Lawgiver of the world; who, seeing it was at his liberty to accept of satisfaction or no, has of necessity the right to make his own terms,—when, and how far forth, and in what manner and method, he will condescend to admit the sinner to the actual benefit of Christ’s satisfaction.

(ii.) And partly, too, from Christ.—For, as he is the Μεσιτης or “Mediator,” between God and man, a friend to both parties, nay, a person consisting of both natures,—the offended and offending; he is engaged necessarily, by virtue both of office and person, to espouse with equal tenderness of regard the interests of both parties: for he is really concerned in them both; they are his concernments, as well as theirs. True, indeed, a surety that discharges a bond by full payment in kind,—he sustains and bears only the person of the debtor, minds only his indemnity, does what he does upon his account and for his sake. But our great Mediator must consult, not only our impunity, but his Father’s, yea, and his own honour. And therefore, ἑχας, ω ἑχας, εστε βεβηλοι [“Hence, O far hence, free, ye profane!”—Edit.], “get you hence,” all you that either yet never did, or that do not now, repent, believe, and conscientiously endeavour to obey. Here is not the least jot of benefit for you, in the case you are in, from this redemption; for, how infinite soever the merit of Christ’s satisfaction is, it confers nothing actually upon any person that has not actually a gospel claim and title to plead it before God.

The immediate effect actually resulting from Christ’s performance is, the procuring the gospel-covenant to be ratified by his Father, as a law, whereby sinners, upon the terms propounded, become reconcilable unto God. Actually it is of force to all that have, but to none that want, the conditions of it. Now the keeping this gospel covenant God expects from us in person; though by the assistance of his Spirit, whom he has promised to give to them that humbly and earnestly ask it of him. (Luke xi. 13.) To affirm that Christ has kept the gospel for us too, is to utter the most self-contradicting blasphemy and absurdity imaginable: as if he could repent, or believe in himself; free, except., or cancel our obligation to obey the moral law, by his own obeying it: as if Christ had so done all, that nothing remains to be done on our part. Such strange extremes do some men run into, that, to avoid justification by works, by an αμετρια της ανθολκης, [“excessive counterbalancing,”] are as extravagant on the other hand; thinking the grace of God cannot be free, except the sinner become either a senseless statue, merely passive; or (which is yet worse) have a writ of ease to be quite idle, or (which is worst of all) a licence to sin by prerogative.

John Gibbon, “The Nature of Justification Opened,” in Puritan Sermons 1659–1689: Being The Morning Exercises at Cripplegate, St. Giles in the Fields, and in Southwark by Seventy-Five Ministers of the Gospel (Wheaton, ILL.: Richard Owen Roberts Publishers, 1981), 5:321–23; see also, [John] Gibbons, The Nature of Justification Opened in a Sermon on Romans V.1 (London: Printed for Tho. Parkhurst, at the Bible and the Three Crowns in Cheapside, near Mercer’s-Chappel, 1695), 26–29.[Some spelling modernized; italics original; Greek transliterated; footnote value modernized and content original; and underlining mine.]

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Note: Gibbon was probably a moderate Calvinist, though at this point this cannot be known with absolute certainty.

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Samuel Petto (c.1624–1711) on Christ Suffering the Idem of the Law’s Punishment

Once more, A debt may be charged upon the principal debtor, after a Surety’s satisfying the obligation, in case the Surety’s name was not at first in the same obligation, but is admitted afterward by voluntary contract, covenant, and consent. For, there the covenant is the only determining rule of all matters concerning the discharge. Why are they not sacrificed and glorified immediately after their coming into the world (these being effects of the death of Christ) but because the covenant provides otherwise.

In the name of Jesus Christ (as as surety) had been originally or at first in Adam’s obligation, then more might have been said for an immediate discharge upon his payment of our debt, and suffering death, but this was not the case, for if it had, then his suffering death had been necessary and unavoidable, though no New Testament had ever been made, yea, the making of it had been unnecessary, vain and useless.

Whereas it was extremely necessary, there could have been no transferring of our guilt to him, without it, and his submitting to death was by voluntary contract, Joh. 10: 17,18. And his name not being at first in our bond, hence, his payment was a refusable transaction.

It was by an act of free grace that he was admitted to undertake for us, and his payment accepted in our stead, and so though he paid the idem, the same that we did owe, yet there was nothing contrary to justice or equity, if the Father added terms than before, and so no need that we should be ipso facto discharged. And the law passes sentence not only upon sinful actions, but upon the persons for them, Gen. 2:17, Gal. 3:22. And, therefore, no justification, till delivered out of this state, which is at union with Jesus Christ and faith.

Samuel Petto, The Difference Between the Old and New Covenant Stated and Explained (London: Printed for Eliz. Calvert, at the Sign of the Black Spred-Eagle at the West end of St. Pauls, 1674), 282–84. [Some minor reformatting; italics original; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

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Note: (1) Petto’s claim here runs counter-intuitive to a natural sense of justice for what it means to make a payment of the exact same kind as demanded in the original obligation. It would mean that given that the transaction has been “re-termed,” due to the surety’s name added after the creation of the original obligation, the creditor is free to add further conditions. Imagine a man orders his meal while in a restaurant. After eating, it turns out the man has left his wallet at home. His friend steps in and offers to pay the original debt. But now the manager decides to increase the debt by adding an invented surcharge. Such an increase would be counter to our natural sense of justice, given that the payment by the second party was exactly of the same kind as due in the original obligation. In this scenario, the only thing that has been “re-termed” as it were, is not the payment, but he who makes the payment. (2) Further, imagine this scenario. A man stands before a judge. It is determined by the judge that the man must pay a fine. However, he cannot, so a benefactor steps in and pays the fine. Yet, upon receiving the payment–which was the same as due in the original obligation–the judge continues to hold the original party in debtor’s prison. What sense of justice could warrant to judge to hold the man in prison until some other, extraneous, condition was met? See the further explanation by John Gibbon. (3) These questions and problems remain unless we are careful to distinguish between a properly pecuniary satisfaction versus a properly penal satisfaction, along with the issue of what “satisfaction,” itself, means. My suspicion is that Petto blurs the line between a pecuniary and penal satisfaction. And so, while Petto could just assert all that he has asserted here, there does remain the question and problem of its coherency, or lack thereof. Compare on this the comments by John Gibbon among others. (4) It would say that Petto’s position is a mediating position on this subject, as Petto rejects the commitment to an ipso facto remission, which sets it apart from Owen on this point. (5) To his credit, Petto does move the conversation in a better direction, contra Owen, in that he allows for new conditions being added to original obligation. These condition cut-off certain entailments such as eternal justification and the idea of ipso facto remission.

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Revisiting John 17 and Jesus’s Prayer for the World

Revisiting John 17 and Jesus’s Prayer for the World
Regarding Jesus’s prayer in John 17, these 5 claims are always alleged, assumed, and asserted, even though they are never supported by any confirming evidence:

1. That this is a specific and effectual high priestly prayer on the part of Jesus.
2. That the “world” of 17:9 respects the world of the reprobate.
3. That those “given” in verse 9 represent the totality of the elect.
4. That the extent of the high priestly intercession delimits the scope of the satisfaction.
5. That the two parallel clauses in verses 21 and 23 are systemically overlooked or misread.

This short essay will not attempt to answer 1–4, specifically, but will rather focus on claim 5: that the two parallel clauses in verses 21 and 23 are systemically overlooked or misread.

The verses read:

17:21: that they may all be one; even as You, Father, are in Me and I in You, that they also may be in Us, so that the world may believe [πιστευω] that You sent Me

17:23: I in them and You in Me, that they may be perfected in unity, so that the world may know [γινωσκω] that You sent Me, and loved them, even as You have loved Me.

Or in short:

21 so that the world may believe [πιστευω] that You sent Me.

23 so that the world may know [γινωσκω] that You sent Me.

Some writers, like John Calvin and John Gill, attempt to divert the import of believe and know, in verses 21 and 23. It is interesting that Calvin notes that “world” in vs 21 and 13 must be the world of the reprobate, given its usage throughout the chapter. But yet, when it comes to πιστευω and γινωσκω he drops this rule and makes them refer to something other than true saving faith. Calvin said:

The verb, to believe, has been inaccurately [imprecisely; Parker translation] used by the Evangelist for the verb, to know; that is, when unbelievers, convinced by their own experience, perceive the heavenly and Divine glory of Christ. The consequence is, that, believing, they do not believe, because this conviction does not penetrate into the inward feeling of the heart. And it is a just vengeance of God, that the splendor of Divine glory dazzles the eyes of the reprobate, because they do not deserve to have a clear and pure view of it. He afterwards uses the verb, to know, in the same sense.¹

Gill did something similar. After saying that “world” in v. 21 may mean the rest of the elect, he preferred that it means the remaining Jews and Deists who will be forced to acknowledge Jesus as Messiah at the last day.² That has to be a very eccentric and strained reading of the text.

I do not believe that they are warranted to change the normal meanings of believe and know, as used by John in his gospel, such that they mean something other than saving or salvific belief and knowledge.³ That is, anything other than that they should really believe and know, and this for themselves.

It is interesting that there is actually a parallel usage right in the text itself.

17:8 for the words which You gave Me I have given to them; and they received them and truly understood [γινωσκω] that I came forth from You, and they believed [πιστευω] that You sent Me.

Or simply:

8b truly understood [γινωσκω] that I came forth from You . . .

8c and they believed [πιστευω] that You sent Me

Jesus uses the two verbs believe and know as respecting the same reference. The 11 apostles (at least) had come to know and believe that Jesus had been sent from the Father.

In verses 21 and 23, we see the exact same sentiment repeated but now applied to the world. The order may be reversed but the sentiment is the same, and repeated for emphasis, as with the first instance.

We also see the same exact sentiment in the summary statement of v. 25:

O righteous Father, although the world has not known You, yet I have known You; and these have known [γινωσκω] that You sent Me.

In short:

25 and these have known [γινωσκω] that You sent Me

What is more, if we look outside of John chapter 17, we find other examples of the same sentiment, with the same verbs, as we find in John 17:8, 21, 23, and 25.

John 6:69 And we have believed and have come to know that You are the Holy One of God.

John 16:27 for the Father Himself loves you, because you have loved Me, and have believed that I came forth from the Father.

John 16:30 Now we know that You know all things, and have no need for anyone to question You; by this we believe that You came from God.

Given these verses,⁴ it is likely that this expression had a thematic or formulaic meaning for John. To believe and to know that Jesus has been sent from the Father is the same as to believe in him for salvation. Indeed, what we see here is the language of personal confession. As the John 17 comments are part of a wider or general thematic intent in John, it is more likely that the comments in John 17 fit into that theme, rather than just asserting, rather atextually, that with regard to John 17:21 and 23, either that John incorrectly used the word “believe” (Calvin), or that his intent was to jump to the final eschaton, where it is, alleged, that the “world” (namely Jews and Deists) will finally come to know and believe, against the desire of their hearts, that Jesus was the Messiah after all (Gill).

Both Calvin and Gill have trapped themselves at this point because they have bought into the idea that kosmos in verse 9 denotes the non-elect, rather than the world of mankind, alive, and living in rebellion and opposition to God and his church. The sort of equivocation Calvin and Gill call for is not derived from the text but from something outside of the text of scripture altogether. Certain false lexical and theological constraints have, as it were, hijacked what should have been their correct exegesis and biblical theology.

However, once the meaning of kosmos throughout the chapter is allowed to assume its normal meaning, and once the meanings of the verbs believe and know are allowed to be read consistently (as defined by context and usage rather than atextual interpolations), then according the standard rules of hermeneutics, the strict particularist reading of this passage really has no footing in this chapter. For without doubt, if Christ prays for the world, that they should know and believe, then he has most assuredly died for the world. For how could Christ pray for a man for whom he has not died?

Given that meaning is determined by context and usage, it’s clear that the there is here a prayer that the world truly believe and know that Jesus has been sent from the Father, just as the Apostles now believe and know that Jesus is sent from the Father. This cannot mean bare knowledge of facts or “historical belief” or “historical knowledge,” or a belief in terror or dread at the last judgment, but true and proper saving belief. Furthermore, we know that this is a prayer for the world’s salvation because of the clear presence of the subjunctives (v. 21, ἵνα ὁ κόσμος πιστεύη, and v. 23, ἵνα γινώσκη ὁ κόσμος). Christ prays that future believers be one for the purpose that the world may believe and know that Jesus has been sent from the Father. And having recognized this, we can discern in what sense he does and does not pray for the world. While it is true that Jesus in this prayer does not pray in behalf of the world, as he prays in behalf of present and future believers, nonetheless, his prayer does have regard for the world in that it is a prayer for the benefit of the world, namely their salvation.

Lastly, given the two clauses in John 17, it becomes more doubtful that the prayer of John 17 should be considered specifically as an effectual “high priestly” prayer. Rather it is a personal prayer of the Son as general mediator between God and mankind.
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1. John Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans. William Pringle (Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 2010), 184. The Parker translation reads: “The verb to believe was imprecisely used by the Evangelist for ‘to know’; that is, when unbelievers, convicted by their own experience, perceive the heavenly and divine glory of Christ. Hence, believing they do not believe; for this feeling does not penetrate into the inward attitude of the heart. And it is a just vengeance from God that the splendour of the divine glory dazzles the eyes of the reprobate, because they are unworthy of a genuine and clear view of it. Afterwards He uses the verb to know in the same sense.” John Calvin, “The Gospel According to Saint John 11–21 and The First Epistle of John,” trans. T. H. L. Parker, in Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, ed. D. W. Torrance and T. F. Torrance, 12 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 5:148–49.

2. “that the world may believe that thou hast sent me; either the rest of God’s chosen people in the world, not yet called; or rather the wicked and reprobate part of the world, particularly Jews and Deists: they shall see the concord and agreement of the saints in doctrine, worship, and affection in the latter day; and when all the elect shall be gathered together, and not only their union to each other, but to the divine persons, shall clearly appear; they will then believe, and be obliged to own, that Jesus is the true Messiah, was sent of God, and is no impostor.” John Gill, An Exposition of the New Testament, vol. 2 of The Baptist Commentary Series (London: Mathews and Leigh, 1809), 89.

3. Needless to be said, by this I do not mean that all will be saved (Universalism) but that the aim of Christian unity, in this prayer, is that the world similarly come to a true and living faith in Christ.

4. Another verse of interest is John 13:35 “By this all men will know that you are My disciples, if you have love for one another. I do not think that either Calvin’s or Gill’s lines of interpretation would do justice to this verse. More likely the meaning is that “all men” know that Christians are the followers of Jesus in marvel and wonder (not in fear and dread), and that the aim of “loving one another” is the conversion of all men.

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