Peter Lombard (1100–1160) on the Death of Christ: Christ Died for All Sufficiently, for the Elect Efficiently

Primary Source:

1. ON THE HANDING OVER OF CHRIST, WHICH IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DONE BY THE FATHER, THE SON, JUDAS, AND THE JEWS. And so Christ is the priest, as he is also the victim and the price of our reconciliation. He offered himself on the altar of the cross not to the devil, but to the triune God, and he did so for all with regard to the sufficiency of the price, but only for the elect with regard to its efficacy, because he brought about salvation only for the predestined.

Peter Lombard, The Sentences. Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2010), 86; Sententiarum libri quatuor, 3.20.5. “Christus ergo est sacerdos, idemque et hostia pretium nostrae reconciliationis: qui se in ara crucis non diabolo, sed Trinitati obtulit pro omnibus, quantum ad pretii sufficientiam; sed pro electis tantum salutem effecit.”

Secondary sources:

1. David Paraeus (from his contribution to Ursinus’s Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism):

Lombard writes as follows: “Christ offered himself to God, the Trinity for all men, as it respects the sufficiency of the price; but only for the elect as it regards the efficacy thereof, because he effected, and purchased salvation only for those who were predestinated.”

Zacharias Ursinus, The Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism, trans. G. W. Williard (Cincinnati, OH: Elm Street Printing Company, 1888), 224; Sixteenth Lord’s Day, Q. 40, §3.

2. G. Michael Thomas:

“He offered himself for all as far as the sufficiency of the price is concerned, but, as far as efficacy is concerned, for the elect only.” Libri Sententiarum Quatuor, in J. Migne (ed.), Cursus Completus Patrologiae, Paris 1845.

G. Michael Thomas, The Extent of the Atonement: A Dilemma for Reformed Theology from Calvin to the Consensus (1536–1675) (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster, 1997), 5, 9n10.

Original post here (click).

Christ Lays His Life Down for His Sheep (John 10:15): An Analysis of an Argument for Limited Atonement

Prefacing Remarks
The reader should keep a few things in mind while reading this short essay.

Firstly, the following is a layman’s analysis of the logic involved in establishing a case for limited atonement from John 10:15 and John 10:26. The intent is to lay out the case in a non-technical manner for lay-readers. It is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the issues involved.

Secondly, it may be said that there are two types of arguments which use John 10:15 to prove limited atonement. The first is what one might call a strong form of the argument. This strong form of the argument insists that John 10:15 along with 10:26 establish a hard dichotomy between those for whom Christ did and did not die. That is, in no proper sense did Christ die for the non-elect. By “proper sense” I mean either in terms of penal relationship (“For whose sins was Christ punished?”), or divine intentionality to save (either by secret or revealed will). The issue stated this way avoids the distracting claims by some advocates of limited atonement that Christ died for all insofar as he secured common grace benefits for all.

Thirdly, the weaker form of the argument would intimate that John 10:15 suggests a distinction, not so much a dichotomy, namely, that Christ died for some distinctively, as opposed to others. Here the stress would be that John 10:15 shows us that it can be said that Christ died in a distinctive sense for the elect, in a sense in which he did not die for the non-elect. Stated another way, Christ died for the elect in a distinctive sense, as opposed to the sense in which he (may have?) died for the non-elect. I would still maintain that even this is not sustained by a sound reading of John 10:15.

For the purposes of this essay, it is the strong form of the argument which is under review. The weaker form is dealt with only in the comments section. It is there I will also follow-up on some added rejoinders from another location on the web. Readers need to keep in mind that I do not deny that Christ died for the elect in a sense in which he did not die for the non-elect. If we speak of the intentionality of Christ, I can say, in the sense that Christ died for the sheep, he did not die for the non-sheep.

Part 1: The Critique
This argument for limited atonement works like this in a syllogism:

Major Premise:

• Christ lays down his life for the sheep (John 10:15)

Minor Premise:

• The Pharisees are not Christ’s sheep (John 10:26)

Conclusion:

• Therefore, Christ did not lay his life down for the Pharisees.

Stated without the prefixed comments:

1. Christ lays down his life for the sheep.
2. The Pharisees are not Christ’s sheep.
3. Therefore, Christ did not lay his life down for the Pharisees.

The problem is that its formally invalid.

Let us use an analogy which follows the same form, yet clearly demonstrates the invalidity of the form of the argument.

1. John loves his children.
2. Sally is not a child of John.
3. Therefore, John does not love Sally.

This is an invalid argument. Sally could be John’s wife and mother to his children, and so another person whom John truly and rightly loves.

You can swap out any terms and the invalid result will be same.

What’s happened is that the negative inference has been smuggled in, resulting in something like the following.

The Simple Positive:

• John loves his children

is converted into a simple negative

• John loves only his children.

Then the syllogism is followed out:

1. John loves only his children.
2. Sally is not a child of John.
3. Therefore, John does not love Sally.

That is now a valid form of an argument.

And if we bring this back to John 10:15, the syllogism now looks like this with the smuggled in negation:

1. Christ lays down his life only for the sheep.
2. The Pharisees are not Christ’s sheep.
3. Therefore, Christ did not lay his life down for the Pharisees.

Either consciously or unconsciously, many readers have converted “Christ lays down his life for the sheep” as being identical to or as entailing, “Christ lays down his life only for the sheep.” However, this is an invalid negative inference.

The problem is the conversion of the simple positive to a universal negative. This is the negative inference fallacy that Dabney referenced:

In proof of the general correctness of this theory of the extent of the Atonement, we should attach but partial force to some of the arguments advanced by Symington and others, or even by Turrettin, e.g. that Christ says, He died “for His sheep,” for “His Church,” for “His friends,” is not of itself conclusive. The proof of a proposition does not disprove its converse. All the force which we could properly attach to this class of passages is the probability arising from the frequent and emphatic repetition of this affirmative statement as to a definite object.

R. L. Dabney, Lectures on Systematic Theology, 521.

D. A. Carson also remarked on the negative inference fallacy:

…one form of improper syllogism is the negative inference, but this form is so common that it deserves separate notice and more lavish illustration. It does not necessarily follow that if a proposition is true, a negative inference from that proposition is also true. The negative inference may be true, but this cannot be assumed, and in any case is never true because it is a negative inference.

D. A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, 2nd ed. (Carlisle, U.K.; Grand Rapids, MI: Paternoster; Baker Books, 1996), 101–102.

There have been a few attempts by limited atonement advocates to claim that the negative inference fallacy does not apply in this case. These attempts are quite astounding. Imagine a Romanist saying that the proposition, “Justified by faith alone” does not apply here, such that we can make a converse positive inference that we can be justified by faith and works. We cannot be arbitrary when it comes to enforcing the universal and standard rules of logical inference.

And it should be straightforward that one should never seek to establish a positive argument based on invalid inferences. Such attempts will always and everywhere be invalid. Even repeating the invalid inference ad infinitum will never make it valid.

What is more, with that aside, Scripture declares emphatically in 1 Cor 4:6,

Now these things, brethren, I have figuratively applied to myself and Apollos for your sakes, so that in us you may learn not to exceed what is written, so that no one of you will become arrogant in behalf of one against the other.

No matter how tempting it is, no matter how important it is to one’s system, it is wrong to insert a negation into a verse where it was not originally present. This problem is further exacerbated if after smuggling in the extra-textual negation, one then tries to sustain the case for limited atonement. This then becomes grounds for a circular argument.

Lastly, one should also keep in mind that readers of John’s Gospel should not jump to the hasty conclusion that because of what Jesus says in John 10, that the Pharisees are goats (in other words, reprobates). Rather, one cannot preclude the possibility that they are rebellious and wayward sheep:

All of us like sheep have gone astray, Each of us has turned to his own way; But the LORD has caused the iniquity of us all to fall on Him (Isa 53:6).

Here Isaiah speaks to the apostate house of Israel, as much as he does to the faithful, who have been themselves wayward sheep. If this is correct, then the contrast would be between obedient sheep versus disobedient sheep (the Pharisees), but not between the elect and the non-elect.

Part 2: The Affirmation
What is actually going on in John 10 is more like this:

I am the good shepherd; the good shepherd lays down His life for the sheep.
He who is a hired hand, and not a shepherd, who is not the owner of the sheep, sees the wolf coming, and leaves the sheep and flees, and the wolf snatches them and scatters them.
He flees because he is a hired hand and is not concerned about the sheep.
I am the good shepherd, and I know My own and My own know Me, even as the Father knows Me and I know the Father; and I lay down My life for the sheep.
I have other sheep, which are not of this fold; I must bring them also, and they will hear My voice; and they will become one flock with one shepherd (John 10:11–16).

The point is not about the extent of Christ’s death at all, but the faithfulness and the loyalty of Christ to the sheep. The pharisees are the hirelings who abandon the sheep, unlike the brave and heroic good shepherd of Israel. Jesus is saying to them something like this, “I am not like you, who run away, rather I will lay my life down for the sheep, defending them to the end…” And by implication, we, the sheep, can truly know that Christ will do what it takes to effectually save us, even at the cost of his own life.

Thus, the real emphasis and attention should be on this verse:

I have other sheep, which are not of this fold; I must bring them also, and they will hear My voice; and they will become one flock with one shepherd (John 10:16).

In this verse alone we have election, Christ’s intent to save, and the effectual call.

When we put together v. 15 and v. 16, we see in the mind of Christ a special intention to gather and faithfully lay his life down for his sheep so that they may be saved to the uttermost. He came to earth, not as a hireling coming to a field, but to gather those given to him. This is the direction we should move in, not in pressing the limited extent of the expiation.

When rightly understood, then, the verse speaks to a special intent of the satisfaction, not to the extent of the satisfaction.

Original post without modifications here (click).

Additional Notes and Observations (Updated on 2-3-25)

This section will be further expanded in the near future. In addition to the fallacies outlined above, the decretal or high view of this chapter has the following problems:

The High View is A-Contextual

• The Context is About a Good Shepherd vs. Hireling Contrast
• The Verse is Not About For Whom Christ Died, but Rather About What Kind of Shepherd Jesus is as Over Against the Mere Hirelings
• It is Not Even Mainly About Penal Substitution, But Rather About an Heroic Kind of Death vs. A Cowardly Abandonment

By saying the above, I am not saying either that penal substitution is not taught in the bible or in the Gospel of John, or that a penal satisfaction is not included with the heroic nature of the Good Shepherd’s death, all things considered. I am just saying the penal substitutionary nature of Christ’s death is not the focus, or at least not the main focus, in the specific context of John 10:11. Rather, the focus is upon the ideal protector or the goodness of the true Davidic-like shepherd, who so loves the sheep that he even dies heroically to spare or rescue them from the attacks of the wolf. The mere hireling, in contrast, rather acts like this:

But a hireling, he who is not the shepherd, one who does not own the sheep, sees the wolf coming and leaves the sheep and flees; and the wolf catches the sheep and scatters them (John 10:12, NKJV).

• The two types of metaphorical animals that are contrasted, or who are at odds with one another in John 10, are sheep versus wolves, not sheep versus goats.

A wolf, such as Saul the Pharisee, may become a sheep, such as Paul the Apostle.

The High View Misunderstands “Sheep”

• The Owenian view thinks the “sheep” for whom Christ laid down his life (v. 15) are all the elect qua elect, even if they distinguish between elect as such (v. 16; all the elect Gentiles) and the believing elect (v. 27; or the “sheep of His pasture”) in the broader context, and that “not my sheep” (v. 26) means the non-elect. This abstract manner of speaking of the “sheep” as all of the elect as such is as old as Augustine, then it was picked up by Calvin,  and taken into extremes by the stricter Calvinists. Note what Calvin said:

Yet I admit that it [what Augustine said in Hom. in Joan. 45.12, i.e., “In regard to the secret predestination of God, there are very many sheep without, and very many wolves within”] applies in the sense that Christ calls unbelievers ‘sheep’ who in themselves could not be regarded as sheep at all. And by this word He not only shows what they will be, but, even more, refers it to the secret election of God, in that we are already God’s sheep before we are aware that He is our Shepherd; just as elsewhere we are called enemies, even when He loved us (Rom. 5.10) and this is also why Paul says that we were known of God before we knew Him (Gal. 4.9).

John Calvin, “The Gospel according to St John 1–10,” trans. T. H. L. Parker, in Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, ed. D. W. Torrance and T F. Torrance, 12 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 4:267. Although Calvin was not himself a stricter (or high) sort on the extent of Christ’s death, he nevertheless interpreted some passages in the way that they do. Augustine himself held to universal redemption, but he still interpreted some passages in a decretal sense.

John Owen said that the elect, even “in the same state of actual alienation from God, yet then … are said to be … the sheep of Christ before they are called ... before they come into the flock or congregation” (John Owen, “A Display of Arminianism,” The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, n.d.], 10:64). In the context of John 10 and the purpose of Christ in laying down his life, Owen said, “We deny that the primary difference that here is made by our Saviour is between believers and not believers, but between elect and not elect, sheep and not sheep” (Owen, “Death of Death,” in The Works of John Owen, 10:219). Again, Owen said, “The opposition is between sheep and not sheep, and that with reference to their election, and not to their vocation” (Owen, “Death of Death,” 10:220; emphasis added). Owen allowed for some distinctions in the overall context regarding the elect qua elect and elect qua believer, saying, “If there be a distinction to be allowed, it can be nothing but this, that the ‘sheep’ who are simply so called are those who are only so to Christ from the donation of his Father; and the ‘sheep of his pasture,’ those who, by the effectual working of the Spirit, are actually brought home to Christ. And then of both sorts we have mention in this chapter, verses 16 [elect qua elect Gentiles], 27 [elect qua believers], both making up the number of those sheep for whom he gave his life [in v. 15], and to whom he giveth life” (Owen, “Death of Death,” 10:220).

• “Not My Sheep” is a Rebuke. One Cannot Rebuke one by saying, “you are not elect.” People are damned by desert, not by mere decree. See Thomas Manton.
• They Do Not Understand the Proleptic Nature of Jesus’s Words “I have” and “My Sheep.”

Proleptic language is common in the bible. It occurs when a prophet speaks about the future as though it has already happened, in order to convey the certainty of the future. It is a “prophetic technique treating a future even as past (Amos 5:1–2).” Also called a prophetic perfect, “The writer or speaker is so certain that an event will take place in the future that he speaks of it as though it already had taken place by using the perfect form of the Hebrew verb: it is also called the perfect of certainty” (F. B. Huey Jr. and Bruce Corley, A Students Dictionary for Biblical and Theological Studies: A Handbook of Special and Technical Terms [Grand Rapids: Academie Books (Zondervan), 1983], 157–58). A classic example is in Jude 14, where Enoch is described as saying, “the Lord came with his holy myriads” (RSV). Other translations (e.g., the ASV; BBE; DBY; ESV; NAB; NAS; YLT) also rightly put it in the past tense, while others interpret the verb in a present (“is coming”) or future tense (“will come”). The point of the past tense is to say that the Lord’s future coming is so certain to happen, the prophet speaks of it as though the Lord has already come. He is contemplating a yet-to-be event as though it has already transpired.

The point in the following quotes from exegetical sources is saying that Christ, in saying “other sheep I have” (in John 10:16), is contemplating Gentiles who will come to him in the future as though they have already come, since it is so certain that they will come. He is not, therefore, properly calling them “sheep” while they are in an unbelieving state, but he is thinking about them proleptically, as though they are already believers, now in a real-union possession, and thus are his sheep. “I have” is the proleptic way of saying “I will have” with prophetic certainty. Proleptically, then, they are contemplated as already his sheep, even though they are not yet. Harris observed,

Jesus’s ‘other sheep,’ given to him by the Father (17:7), are Gentiles (cf. 11:52; 12:32), who are proleptically already possessed (ἔχω), although they are actually ‘scattered abroad’ (11:52).

Murray J. Harris, John, Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2015), 197–98.

Bloomfield noted,

It is observable that Christ calls the Gentile folds his sheep, by prolepsis, though yet in ignorance and idolatry, since he not only meant that his doctrine should be propagated amongst them (John 17:18; Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:15), but also since he foresaw that they would embrace his religion.

Samuel Thomas Bloomfield, Recensío Synoptíca Annotationis Sacræ, 8 vols. (London: C. and J. Rivington; Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1826–1860), 3:396–397.

D. A. Carson on the Fallacy of the Negative Inference

5. Negative inferences

As we have just seen, one form of improper syllogism is the negative inference, but this form is so common that it deserves separate notice and more lavish illustration. It does not necessarily follow that if a proposition is true, a negative inference from that proposition is also true. The negative inference may be true, but this cannot be assumed, and in any case is never true because it is a negative inference. This can easily be presented in syllogistic form.

Consider two examples:

All orthodox Jews believe in Moses.
Mr. Smith is not an orthodox Jew.
Therefore Mr. Smith does not believe in Moses.

This clearly does not hold up, because the conclusion depends on a negative inference from the major premise. Mr. Smith may be an unorthodox Jew who believes in Moses; or he may be a Gentile who believes in Moses.

Try a second example:

All who have faith in Jesus are saved.
Mr. Jones does not have faith in Jesus.
Therefore Mr. Jones is not saved.

From the perspective of New Testament theology, the conclusion is true; but the syllogism is invalid. In other words, this is an improper way of reaching a true conclusion. If the major premise read “Only those who have faith in Jesus are saved” instead of “All who have faith in Jesus are saved,” then of course the new syllogism would constitute a valid argument.

In 2 Corinthians 13:5 Paul writes: “Examine yourselves to see whether you are in the faith; test yourselves. Do you not realize that Christ Jesus is in you—unless, of course, you fail the test?” (NIV). Calvin understands Paul to be saying “that all are reprobates, who doubt whether they profess Christ and are a part of His body”²⁶—an interpretation which, as C. K. Barrett observes, “can hardly be said to follow.”²⁷ Calvin seems to be arguing as follows:

Those who have confidence Christ is in them are saved.
Some Corinthians and others doubt (i.e., they do not have this confidence).
Therefore those Corinthians and others are reprobates.

Now I do not believe that the major premise rightly interprets the text in any case; but even if we grant that it represents what Paul is saying, the conclusion does not follow because it is a negative inference. It reflects the Reformer’s position that saving faith entails assurance of salvation; but it is not obvious that Paul is trying to make that point.
_______________
26 John Calvin, Commentary on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, trans. John Pringle, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 2:397.
27 C. K. Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (London: Black, 1973), 338.

D. A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, 2nd ed. (Carlisle, U.K.; Grand Rapids, MI: Paternoster; Baker Books, 1996), 101–103; italics original.

Note: The first example is highly illustrative of the problem. Simple propositions such as, “All orthodox Jews believe in Moses” cannot be converted into “Only orthodox Jews believe in Moses.” This is true for all such biblical statements which simply identify specific persons or groups for whom Christ died.

We could also create an invalid syllogism following the same structure Carson uses:

All sheep are died-for
Smith is not one of the Sheep.
Therefore, Smith is not died-for (namely, not one for whom Christ died).

The conclusion is invalid. However, this is, in essence, the form of the logic used by many proponents of limited satisfaction to argue that Christ died only for the Sheep in John 10. But such logic is invalid, and will never be valid. And recall, it is always wrong to build theological paradigms on invalid syllogisms and logic.

Original post here (click).

Prosper’s Affirmation of Classic Incarnational Christology

At the time Abraham was justified through this faith, he had not yet received God’s command about the circumcision; and though he was then in his natural uncircumcision, his faith was reputed to justice. That same faith received the sign of the circumcision in the part of the body through which the seed of procreation was to advance to that flesh of which, without the seed of the flesh, the Son of God, God the Word, was made flesh and was born of Abraham’s daughter, the Virgin Mary. By His birth among men He made all men His brothers, who would be reborn in Christ through the Spirit and would have Abraham’s faith. But up to the day that the seed should come of which it had been said, In thy seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed, this faith remained confined to the people of one race, and there with the true Israelites the hope of our Redemption was kept alive. For although there were some men of other races whom, whilst the Law was in force, the truth deigned to enlighten, yet they were so few that we can hardly know whether there were any. But notwithstanding the fact that the abundance of grace which now floods the whole world did not then flow with equal bounty, this does not excuse the Gentiles who, being aliens from the conversation of Israel, … having no hope, … and without God in this world, have died in the darkness of their ignorance.

St. Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Prosper of Aquitaine: The Call of All Nations, ed. Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe, trans. P. De Letter, vol. 14 of Ancient Christian Writers (New York; Ramsey, NJ: Newman Press, 1952), 113–14; italics original.

Original post here (click).

John L. Dagg (1794–1884) on Christ Suffering So Much for So Much Sin: Speculation Taking Us Down the Wrong Road

An unrestricted invitation to all who hear the gospel, to come to Christ for life, seems to imply that universal provision has been made in him; and in order to the making of universal provision, it appears necessary that he should have borne the sins of all men.

But the supposition that he bore the sins of the whole human race, is attended with much difficulty. Multitudes died in impenitence before he came into the world, and were suffering for their sins in the other world, while he was hanging on the cross. How could he be a substitute for these, and suffer the penalty for their sins, when they were suffering it in their own persons? And if he endured the penalty for the sins of all who have since died, or shall hereafter die in impenitence, how shall they be required to satisfy justice a second time by personal suffering?

For a solution of this difficulty, with which the minds of many have been much perplexed, it has been supposed that the amount of suffering necessary to make an atoning sacrifice, is not increased or lessened by the amount of sin to be atoned for. This hypothesis is entitled to respect, not only because of the relief which it affords the mind, but also because it has recommended itself to the general acceptance of learned and pious men. Nevertheless, like every other hypothesis invented for the removal of difficulty, it should not be made an article of faith, until it has been proved.

In support of the hypothesis, it has been argued that since the wages of sin is death, Christ must have died for a single sin, and he needed only to die, in making atonement for the sins of the whole world.

This argument does not sustain the hypothesis, unless it be assumed that death is the same in every supposable case. But death may be an easy and joyful transition from this world to the world of bliss. Such was not the death of Christ. Death, as the wages of sin, includes more than the mere dissolution of the body: and Christ, in dying for sin, endured an amount of sorrow which was not necessary to mere natural death. In this suffering, the expiatory efficacy of his death chiefly consisted; and we dare not assume that the amount of it must be the same in every supposable case. The sufferings of Christ derive infinite value from his divine nature; but, being endured by his human nature, their amount could not be infinite; hence it is supposable that the amount might have been different in different circumstances. The inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah will, in the last day, be doomed to the second death, equally with the more guilty inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida: but the anguish attendant will be more intolerable in one case than in the other. Analogy would seem to require, that Christ, suffering for the sins of the whole world, must endure more than if suffering for only one sin.

The advocates of the hypothesis urge, that the atonement is moral, and not commercial; and they object, that the notion of so much suffering for so much sin, degrades it into a mere commercial transaction. According to an illustration before given, if twenty men owe one hundred dollars, commercial justice is satisfied when each man has paid five dollars; but when twenty men have conspired to commit murder, moral justice, or rather distributive justice (for commercial justice is also moral), holds every man guilty of the deed, and as deserving of capital punishment as if he alone had committed the crime. On the same principle, it is maintained, moral justice does not divide the death of Christ into parts, accounting so much for each offence; but regards it as equally sufficient for many offences, as for one; and equally sufficient for the sins of the whole world, as for the sins of the elect.

The argument is not conclusive. It is not true, that the principle of distributive justice repels the notion of so much suffering for so much sin. Justice has its scales in government, as well as in commerce; and an essential part of its administration consists in the apportionment of penalties to crimes. It does not account the stealing of herbs from a neighbor’s garden, and the murder of a father, crimes of equal magnitude; and it does not weigh out to them equal penalties. The justice of God has a heavier penalty for Chorazin and Bethsaida, than for Sodom and Gomorrah. Everything of which we have knowledge in the divine administration, instead of exploding the notion of so much suffering for so much sin, tends rather to establish it. The objection that it is commercial, is not well founded. Though justice in government, and justice in commerce, may be distinguished from each other, it does not follow, that whatever may be affirmed of the one, must necessarily be denied of the other. Distributive justice is not that which determines the equality of value, in commodities which are exchanged for each other: but it does not therefore exclude all regard to magnitudes and proportions. In the language of Scripture, sins are debts,¹ the blood of Christ is a price,² and his people are bought.³ This language is doubtless figurative: but the figures would not be appropriate, if commercial justice, to which the terms debt, price, bought, appertain, did not bear an analogy to the distributive justice which required the sacrifice of Christ.

In the case adduced for illustration, every accomplice in the murder is held guilty of the crime, because every one has the full intention of it. Justice, viewing the crime in the intention, accounts each one guilty, and requires the penalty to be inflicted on him. It does not admit that the punishment of one will be equivalent to the punishment of all: but, in this very case, employs its scales to give to every one his due, and apportions the amount of penalty inflicted, to the amount of crime.

This examination of the argument discovers, that it is not conclusive. If the atonement of Christ excludes all regard to the amount of sin to be expiated, the exclusion does not arise from the abstract principles of distributive justice, as distinguished from commercial, but from something peculiar in the great transaction. No transaction like it with which it may be compared, has ever occurred. The wisdom and justice of God have decided this single case, and have decided it right. Christ did endure just so much suffering, as would expiate the sins that were laid on him. What amount of suffering would have been necessary, if he had expiated but one sin, is a question which, so far as we know, has never been decided in the court of heaven. When we confidently decide it, we are in danger of intruding into those things which do not belong to us. If the Holy Scriptures teach us nothing on the subject, we should not seek to be wise above what is written.

The Scriptures, so far as I know, contain no proof of the hypothesis. The best argument in its favor is drawn from Hebrews 9, in which it is taught that, if the sacrifices of the old dispensation had been efficacious, they would not have needed to be repeated. This seems to involve the principle, that an efficacious sacrifice for sin, when once made, will suffice for all sin, however it may be multiplied in all future time; and this principle, if established, establishes the hypothesis before us. But the clause “then would they not have ceased to be offered,” may be taken without an interrogative point following, and the argument of Paul will be, that the sacrifices of the Old Testament dispensation, if efficacious, would have continued to be offered from year to year, making atonement for the sins of each year as it passed, and would not have been superseded by another covenant, as the Lord had foretold by his prophet. So interpreted, the argument of Paul, instead of establishing the hypothesis, subverts it. But if the clause be read with the interrogative point, it may still be understood to refer to the remembrance from year to year continually of the same sins, that had once been atoned for. When the sins of one year had been atoned for, why should the very same sins be brought into remembrance the second, third, and fourth years, and the offering for them repeated, if the first offering had been efficacious? So understood, the apostle’s argument does not establish the principle involved in the hypothesis.

If, after a thorough examination of the hypothesis, we should, instead of making it an article of faith, be inclined to abandon it; and if the difficulty which it was invented to remove should perplex us; we may obtain relief, as we are compelled to do in other cases, by receiving the whole of God’s truth on his authority, even though the harmony of its parts is not apparent to our weak understandings. In this way, theological difficulties furnish an opportunity for the exercise of confidence in the divine veracity: and our state of mind is never better or safer than when, in simple faith, we take God at his word.

So far as we have the means of judging, the sufferings of Christ, when viewed apart from the purpose of God respecting them, were in themselves as well adapted to satisfy for the sins of Judas as of Peter. But we cannot affirm this of every act which Christ performed in his priestly office. His intercessions for Peter were particular and efficacious; and these, as a part of his priestly work, may be included with his sufferings, as constituting with them the perfect and acceptable offering which he, as the great High Priest, makes for his people. The atonement or reconciliation which results, must be as particular as the intercessions by which it is procured.

Some have maintained that, if the atonement of Christ is not general, no sinner can be under obligation to believe in Christ, until he is assured that he is one of the elect. This implies that no sinner is bound to believe what God says, unless he knows that God designs to save him. God declares that there is no salvation, except through Christ; and every sinner is bound to believe this truth. If it were revealed from heaven, that but one sinner, of all our fallen race, shall be saved by Christ, the obligation to believe that there is no salvation out of Christ, would remain the same. Every sinner, to whom the revelation would be made, would be bound to look to Christ as his only possible hope, and commit himself to that sovereign mercy by which some one of the justly condemned race would be saved. The abundant mercy of our God will not be confined to the salvation of a single sinner; but it will bring many sons to glory through the sufferings of Jesus, the Captain of our salvation. Yet every sinner, who trusts in Christ for salvation, is bound to commit himself, unreservedly, to the sovereign mercy of God. If he requires some previous assurance that he is in the number of the elect, he does not surrender himself to God, as a guilty sinner ought. The gospel brings every sinner prostrate at the feet of the Great Sovereign, hoping for mercy at his will, and in his way: and the gospel is perverted when any terms short of this are offered to the offender. With this universal call to absolute and unconditional surrender to God’s sovereignty, the doctrine of particular redemption exactly harmonizes.
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1. Matt. 6:12.
2. 1 Cor. 6:20; 1 Pet. 1:18.
3. 1 Cor. 6:20.

J. L. Dagg, Manual of Theology and Church Order (Harrisonburg, VA: Gano Books, 1982), 326–31. [Footnotes and values original; italics original; and underlining mine.] 

See also J. L. Dagg, Manual of Theology, First Part: A Treatise on Christian Doctrine (Charleston, SC; Richmond, VA; Macon, GA; Selma, AL; New Orleans: Southern Baptist Publication Society; S. S. & Publication Board; B. B. & Colporteur Society; B. B. & Book Depository; B. B. Depository, 1859), 326–31.

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Notes: 1) Premise i) Dagg affirms that the expiation of Christ is adaptable to all men. Premise ii) Dagg affirms that Christ suffered that Christ suffered enough to expiate all the sin imputed to him. Premise iii) Dagg affirms that it is more likely the case that had more sin been imputed to Christ, Christ would have had to suffer more in order to expiate this extra imputed sin. 2) Given his premises, it is a clear contradiction for Dagg to assert that the death of Christ is adaptable to all sin. In this world, 2000 years ago, a certain amount of sin was imputed to Christ, under Dagg’s conception, which required a certain amount of suffering on the part of Christ. How then can the expiation affected in this actual world, be adaptable and offerable to all men, even to men whose sins were never imputed to Christ? Dagg wants to retain the free offer of the Gospel, but has no legal or logical way in which this offer can be made coherent. 3) It is also apparent that Dagg has almost totally misunderstood the intent of Scripture’s redemption language. For more on this point, see here (click). I suspect part of the problem is that Dagg is wrongly reacting to Fuller’s insights and critiques. 4) These comments from Dagg mar an otherwise fine Baptist systematic.

Original post here (click).

Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706) on Christ Suffering the Just Equivalent Not the Idem of the Law’s Punishment

Is it the same death, or one equivalent to ours?

Nor (2) did he undergo a bare dissolution of body and soul, in which alone our death consists, but that entire misery which was due to his people from sin, or that same evil which burdened his people due to sin, if not in the same in kind, or rather in number, at least the same in weight and value. For he neither received to himself each and every evil that could be imposed upon us on account of sin—for example, disease, blindness, and all those evils recounted in Deuteronomy 28:15ff.—nor could he receive, for example, the deprivation of the divine image and original righteousness, the eternity of death, and other things. Yet with respect to their kinds, he did undertake those same things which were incumbent upon us to endure, which were, at the least with respect to weight and value, equivalent to our miseries. So that in this death, there was not so much a solutio, a payment, according to its true and proper name, wherein, according to the jurists, the idem, the same thing, is rendered that is in the obligation, which payment cannot be refused by the creditor, but rather a satisfactio, a satisfaction, wherein the tantundem, the same value, is rendered, and which can be rejected by the creditor.³⁰ With this one precaution carefully observed, a great number of difficulties in the business of satisfaction will disappear.
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30 For a prominent debate at the time regarding the idem versus the tantundem of Christ’s death, cf. Richard Baxter (1615–1691), Aphorismes of Justification … wherein also is opened the nature of the covenants, satisfaction, righteousness, faith, works, etc. (London: Francis Tyton, 1649), 44–56; and John Owen, Of the death of Christ, the price he paid, and the purchase he made … vindicated from the exceptions and objections of Mr. Baxter (London: Peter Cole, 1650); idem, Works, ed. William H. Goold (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1862), 10:437–48. Cf. Patrick Gillespie (1617–1675), The Ark of the Covenant Opened (London: for Thomas Parkhurst, 1677), 406, “Christ paid not the idem, but the tantundem; not the same that was due, but the value: for he suffered not the same pain, numero in number, but specie in kind.”

Petrus van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, 7 vols., ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2023), 4:408–409.

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Note: This is new material that is not posted on the original Calvin and Calvinism blog.

Richard Baxter (1615–1691) on Christ Suffering the Tantundem, Not the Idem of the Law’s Punishment

CHAP. V.

Prop. 2: Christ’s sufferings for men’s Sins, were not the Idem, the same thing which the Law threaten to us: Or the fulfilling of the threatening; and discharge of the debt itself in kind. But the Equivalence, or Value, freely paid by him (obliged only by his own sponsion,) and accepted by God, for our not fulfilling the Law, as to its Precept and Commination.

Some think this Question, whether Christ paid the Idem or Tantundem? To be not Tantidem, not worth the disputing. Mr O[wen], (against me) seems stiffly to maintain it to be the Idem, but yielding it to be not per eundem, and the law to be relaxed so far, does yield as much as I need, and gives up the whole cause; and made me think it a useless labor to reply to him. As small as this question seems, I think the main body of divinity stands or falls according to the resolution of it. For understanding the meaning of it, you must know, 1. that it is not the quality of the suffering that we enquire: Whether Christ suffered the same kind of pain, or loss that we should have suffered? Nor of the quantity of torment, for intension or duration? For I am willing to believe as much as identity in these as I can see any ground of probability to encourage me: Though yet I know how hard it is, for them that say, by [death]¹ in the threatening, was meant, death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal, to prove that the loss of God’s image was none of the penalty; (for I hope none will say, that Christ lost God’s image) or that Christ’s temporary sufferings, were the Idem with our eternal, quaod quantitatem; and not the want of duration made up by the intension, or dignity, or the person, as being equivalent: (which is our ordinary doctrine, and I think sound): Or yet that the eternity of the punishment was not in the threatening, but was accidental: Either as, some Schoolmen think, for want of power to deliver or overcome; or as others (and with them Parker and Sanford, I think, not soundly), because of the everlastingness of sinning. I think none of these much worth the disputing, comparatively: Nor 2. Is it de personâ naturali, who he was naturally that paid the debt, or made the satisfaction. It is not therefore de materia debiti, that we enquire, but de formâ: Whether it were the same formally which we owed, and the obligation required? Or only the value, and not the same full debt? Also you must know that, though we may well use the word [debt] in this Case, because the Scripture does, yet we must acknowledge it but a metaphor, and the proper terms are, whether Christ’s sufferings were the same thing that the law in its threatening required, i.e., obliged unto, and made due? And so a fulfilling of that threatening? And this with great averseness I deny. The question is determined on the determination of the former, having necessary dependence on it, and being tantum non in sense the same. And therefore all the arguments which I used for the former will serve to this; and therefore I need not repeat any of them, but refer you to them, desiring you to peruse them and apply them to this; for all the same absurdities (or near all) do follow upon this as on the other. Indeed there two together (that Christ paid the Idem, the debt it self and not the value, by personating us in his sufferings, so that in law sense, we satisfied in him) are the very foundation of the whole frame of that religion commonly called Antinomian, but much more fitly Anti-evangelical. To touch again on some few. It is evident that this doctrine utterly destroys all possibility of pardon of sin, and consequently all repenting and believing, praying for pardon, all thankfulness for it, all Testamental or Evangelical conveyance of it by the promise, all Gospel and ministerial tenders of pardon; all sacramental exhibition and obsignation of pardon; and a Christians enquiries, examination, and seekings after pardon, and his comforts living or dying in assurance of pardon; and instead of all, asserts us to righteous, that we need no pardon. You will sure confess, that if this will follow, then almost all religion is overthrown at a blow. And that it follows, seems to me past doubt. For what can any law in the world require or any lawgiver, in exact justice, but that the law be perfectly fulfilled? What can any creditor require, but the Idem, the very debt it self which the obligation did contain? Can he have all his debt, and remit it too? Is the obligation fulfilled, and remitted or relaxed too? Does the Judge execute all the penalty; and yet forgive it? Is not he unjust that denies him an acquittance and the cancelling of the obligation, who hath fully paid him all his due? If any shall conceive, with the Socinians, that the same inconveniences will follow, upon the asserting of Christ’s full satisfaction for us, I answer, Not one of them: Nay there is no way, I think, but this that I now maintain to confute a Socinian, and defend Christ’s satisfaction. Were it well used, it is a key into a great part of the Body of Divinity, and helps to resolve solidly and satisfactorily a multitude of difficult objections, which without this admit not of solution (though Mr. O. call it my πρῶτον ψεῦδος [first lie, or basic error]) The Idem, or full debt or suffering, is solutio non recusabilis the value in another kind or way, is solutio recusabilis, (stricte dicta satisfactio) more plainly, the proper penalty, which is supplicum delinquentis, is all that can be required to satisfy the Legislator or Law: But that an innocent person should suffer for our sins, is quid Recusabile; the Legislator may refuse it. If therefore we had paid the Idem, the very debt we had been acquitted or to be acquitted ipso facto, as presently righteous, without remission; but when another pays it (even the Son of the Law-giver sent by his own love and mercy, who is nearer him then us ) there two things follow, 1. That the supreme Rector may accept it on what terms he please, or nor accept it: And that accordingly God did accept it on terms most fitted to his blessed ends in governing the world: Among others, that man should have the special benefits of this satisfaction conveyed to them only in a legal way, in time; on such and such terms or conditions as he saw meet, and as is expressed in the tenor of the Covenant of Grace.² &c. Nay it was the desire of Christ the satisfier, that these benefits should only thus be conveyed to the Redeemer: That so though the impetration were wholly by him, and absolutely wrought, yet the Application might be in part by themselves and conditional; and the mercy might not cross Gods ends by making them independent and secure, but might further his ends, in drawing them to him, and engaging them to repent, believe, seek, strive, fear, care, &c.

If the Idem, were paid, that is, the delinquent himself had suffered, there had needed no New Covenant,³ to apply the Benefits, or convey them: But now there doth.

Object. But it may be the Idem, the full due, though not per eundum, by the same person.

Ans. Distinguish (as before) between the Idem Materialiter and Formaliter, also between the full debt and a part. And so, if it were a debt of money or the like 1. It may be fully the same materially, and not formally: As a man may steal that same Money which you owe another, and pay it to that other as his own debt: 2. Here you must distinguish between Personam Naturalem & Civilem vel Legalem: If you pay all that was in the obligation, by your Servant, friend or any delegate or vicar, the law will say, yon have paid it your self. It was your delegates person naturally, but yours legally or rather your instrument, because the obligation required but the thing to be paid in your name, by what hand soever; and so you are acquitted without remission: For you have discharged the proper debt, and the creditor can demand no more.

But now in criminals its otherwise: Because the very person offending is in the obligation as the subject of the penalty: Noxa Caput sequitur. So that formaliter it is not the suffering which was due to you, which another suffers for you. This I add as a main argument for my proposition.

If the law do require only supplicium ipsins delinquentis, then Christ’s sufferings were not the Idem, the same thing which the law required: Nor is the law fulfilled thereby. But the law doth require only supplicium ipsius delinquentis: Therefore, &c. For the major, or its consequence it needs no proof; for Christ was not ipse delinquens; He was made sin, that is, one punishable and punished for sin; but not really, nor in law a sinner. The law never took any man for a sinner that did not sin. Of this more anon. The Minor is proved from the words of the law [In the day thou eat thou shalt dye] [Cursed is he that continues not in all things] It says, [Thou shalt dye] not [another shall dye] for them that say, it means [thou or thy surety] 1. They add to God’s law, out of their own brain, 2. They make the law to know a surety before sin; 3. They confound hereby Law and Gospel: For it is only the Gospel that revealed a surety. 4. They make the law to curse the innocent, and to threaten Christ for our sin dangerously. 5. They make Christ a surety â parte ante, and not ex post facto, and so corrupt the doctrine of his office. Let them therefore prove it before they affirm it. I conclude therefore in this case (as Grotius, Essenins, &c.) Dum alius soluit, simul aliud solvitur. And therefore Mr. O. and others that grant alius soluit, must needs grant that aliud solvitur. It was us and not Christ that the law threatened, and therefore it is not Christ’s sufferings that is the Idem, the thing threatened, but ours; nor that is a proper fulfilling of the commination in the execution. So that the obligation is not ipso facto, in justice void on Christ’s satisfaction, as it would have been on our payment (had ours been possible,) and on the payment of the proper debt.

Again I argue, as before, that is not true doctrine which denies Christ’s proper satisfaction: But so does the opposed doctrine directly. Ergo, &c.

For satisfactio (strictè sumpta) & solutio stricte sumpta, are thus different; satisfactio is solutio tantidem, & solutio stricte sumpta est ejusdem. He therefore that affirmeth that Christ paid our proper debt, denies him to have made proper satisfaction for our non-payment.

Lest you should think me singular herein, I think it meet to show you in some few testimonies, what our greatest divines say in this point.

1. Great Camero says, (page 363 Operum folio.) Objectio qui pro alio satisfecit, is soluit quod ille debet At Christus non soluit quod nos debebamus: Ergo Resp. Ad majorem per distinctionem: Id soluit quod alius debet Pondere & Valore, concedo: Id soluit specie; nego. Jam vero Christus id soluit quod nos debebamus, pondere & valore; quod satis est.

2. Rivet Disput. de satisfact. pag. 253, 254 &c. that which he disputeth for the law’s relaxation, makes wholly for this.

3. Mr. Ball of the Covenant, page 290. There is a twofold payment of Debt: One of the thing altogether the same which was in the Obligation; and this ipso facto frees from punishment, whether it be paid by the debtor himself, or by his Surety. Another of a thing not altogether the same which is in the obligation, so that some act of the creditor or Governour must come unto it, which is called remission: in which case deliverance doth not follow ipso facto, upon the satisfaction. And of this kind is the satisfaction of Christ.

4. Grotius in his Excellent Treatise De satisfactione, hath the same more fully.

5. Essenius defends it in Grotius against the cavils of Crellius at large.

6. Bilson of Christ’s Descent, page 45. and 262. (as cited by Parker.)

7. And Parker that opposes him, says as much as I do: de Descensu Christi, lib. 3. page 108, 109.

Argu. 2. If Christ paid the Idem, or fulfilled the law’s threat, then we who were the persons obliged, may be truly said to have fulfilled it in him. But that is false, therefore I mean the law is not fulfilled by Christ’s sufferings. Of which see the next question.
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1. [Bracketed inserts original to the text.]

2. [Here Baxter means something like the new conditions of salvation, namely faith in Christ, under the terms of the New Covenant.]

3. [Here Baxter seems to indicate that if Christ paid the Idem, then the sinner, for whom he suffered, would be saved under the very terms of the previous legal covenant. Baxter is highlighting an important point here.]

Richard Baxter, Universal Redemption of Mankind by the Lord Jesus Christ (London: Printed for John Salusbury at the Rising-Sun in Cornhill, 1694), 78–85. See also his Aphorismes of Justification … wherein also is opened the nature of the covenants, satisfaction, righteousness, faith, works, etc. (London: Francis Tyton, 1649), 44–56. [Some reformatting; some spelling modernized; all bracketed inserts original; footnotes mine, and underlining mine.]

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Note: What is historically and theologically significant here is that echoes of Baxter’s key points can be seen in Charles Hodge’s criticism of the double payment argument. By Hodge’s time, the classical distinctions of idem versus tantundem had been dropped in many circles having been replaced with the broader categories of pecuniary versus penal satisfaction. Thus by Hodge’s time, the notion of a pecuniary satisfaction functioned in the same way, and to the same effect as the older quantitatively identical payment view of Owen; namely, the payment of the idem, the solutio ejusdem.

Original post here (click).

Patrick Gillespie (1617–1675) on Christ Suffering the Tantundem, Not the Idem of the Law’s Punishment

Now to die ὑπερ ἑαυτί. for us, is to die in our stead, vice nostra: which is so abundantly proved in the learned treatises1 of other men more worthy to hold forth light in this point, that I judge needless to insist upon it, but rather do defer you to them. Only ere I leave this, let me leave with you these thee advertisements concerning Christ’s satisfaction for our violation of the Covenant of Works.

1. Though our punishment and suffering should have been eternal, because we could never out-satisfy; yet the sufferings of Christ, because of the dignity of the person, God-man, were perfectly satisfactory in a short time.

2. Christ paid not the idem, but the tantundem; not the same that was due, but the value: for he suffered not the same pain, numero, but the specie in kind.

3. Ye its one and the same satisfaction in the Law’s sense, which Christ paid, and which we owed, in respect that the Law does not require the Surety to pay the same sum in number, which the debtor borrowed: ‘tis satisfaction in the same in specie, in kind, or in value be paid.
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1. Mr Rutherf. Treatise of the Covenant, pag. 2.t.3.; Brinsl. Of the Mediator, pag. 72, &c.; Dr. Owen.

Partick Gillespie, The Ark of the Covenant Opened: Or, A Treatise of the Covenant of Redemption Between God and Christ, as the Foundation of the Covenant of Grace (London: Printed for Tho. Parkhurst at the bible and three Crowns in Cheapside, near Mercers Chapel, 1677), 406. [Some spelling modernized; italics original; marginal reference cited as footnote; and underlining mine.]

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Note: One should keep in mind that adherence to the so-called Covenant of Works is optional in terms of classic Reformed theology, and that the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction does not stand or fall upon it.

Original post here (click).

George Payne (1781–1848) on the Distinction Between Pecuniary and Penal Satisfaction

Secondly, we proceed to notice the nature of that satisfaction which was rendered to God as the moral Governor of the world. As we proceed, it will be found that the various parts of this great subject illustrate each other. The statements concerning the necessity of the atonement, for instance, partially explain its nature; an exhibition of its nature proves, on the other hand, its necessity. In like manner, the nature of that satisfaction which it is now proposed to investigate, must have received some elucidation from the account just given of the displeasure, on the part of God, which rendered the satisfaction necessary. The correctness of this statement will more fully appear in the course of the following remarks.

The previous definition of the atonement exhibits it in the light of a moral satisfaction. It was stated to be a satisfaction for sin, rendered to God as the moral Governor of the world. Now a moral satisfaction is one entirely sui generis. We must be especially cautious not to identify it in our conceptions with a pecuniary satisfaction. The common and popular phraseology on this subject exposes us to the danger of doing this. Sin is frequently described as a debt, and the atonement as the payment of this debt; and, if we were careful to recollect that these are symbolical or figurative terms, we should not be misled by the phraseology. But the misfortune is, that words which are really figurative, and which are employed for the sole purpose of illustration, have been under. stood and explained literally. Sin has been represented as a real debt, and the atonement as a real payment of that debt; and the unhappy result is, that darkness of the densest kind has been made to envelop the whole subject. There are individuals who imagine that Christ rescues his people from the claims of Divine justice in precisely the same way in which a generous friend delivers a debtor from captivity, by advancing the necessary sum on his behalf. Now I would not affirm that it is impossible for such persons to be saved by an humble hope in the mercy of God, through Jesus Christ; but I can have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that they do not understand the atonement. A pecuniary satisfaction, and a moral satisfaction, differ essentially in their nature, and proceed on radically different principles. Perhaps no man has set this difference in a clearer light than the late Mr. Fuller, whose words I quote :—“I apprehend,” says this excellent writer, “that very important mistakes have arisen from considering the interposition of Christ under the notion of paying a debt. The blood of Christ is, indeed, the price of our redemption, or that for the sake of which we are delivered from the curse of the law; but this metaphorical language, as well as that of head and members, may be carried too far, and may lead us into many errors. In cases of debt and credit among men, when a surety undertakes to represent the debtor, from the moment his undertaking is accepted, the debtor is free, and may obtain his liberty, not as a matter of favour, at least on the part of the creditor, but of strict justice. But who in his sober senses will imagine this to be analogous to the redemption of sinners by Jesus Christ? Sin is a debt only in a metaphorical sense; properly speaking, it is a crime, and satisfaction for it requires to be made, not on pecuniary, but on moral principles. If Philemon had accepted of that part of Paul’s offer which respected property, and had placed so much of it to his account as he considered Onesimus to have owed him, he could not have been said to have remitted his debt, nor would Onesimus have had to thank him for remitting it. But it is supposed of Onesimus, that he might not only be in debt to his master, but have wronged him. Perhaps he had embezzled his goods, corrupted his children, or injured his character. Now for Philemon to accept that part of the offer were very different from the other. In the one case, he would have accepted of a pecuniary representative; in the other, of a moral one; i.e., of a mediator. The satisfaction, in the one case, would annihilate the very idea of remission; but not in the other. Whatever satisfaction Paul might give to Philemon respecting the wound inflicted upon his character and honor, as the head of a family, it would not supersede the necessity of pardon being sought by the offender, and freely bestowed by the offended.

The reason of this difference is easily perceived. Debts are transferable, but crimes are not. A third person may cancel the one, but be can only obliterate the effects of the other; the desert of the criminal remains. The debtor is accountable to his creditor as a private individual, who has power to accept of a surety; or, if he please, to remit the whole without any satisfaction. In the one case, he would be just; in the other, merciful; but no place is afforded by either of them for the combination of justice and mercy in the same proceeding. The criminal, on the other hand, is amenable to the magistrate, or to the head of a family, as a public person; and who, especially if the offence be capital, cannot remit the punishment without invading law and justice; nor, in the ordinary discharge of his office, admit of a third person to stand in his place. In extraordinary cases, however, extraordinary expedients are resorted to. A satisfaction may be made to law and justice, as to the spirit of them, while the letter is dispensed with. The well-known story of Zaleuchus, the Grecian lawgiver, who consented to lose one of his own eyes, to save one of his son’s eyes—who, by transgressing the law, had subjected himself to the loss of both-is an example. Here, as far as it went, justice and mercy were combined in the same act; and had the satisfaction been much fuller than it was—so full that the authority of the law, instead of being weakened, should have been abundantly magnified and honored, still it had been perfectly consistent with hee forgiveness. Finally, in the case of the debtor, satisfaction being once accepted, justice requires his complete discharge; but, in that of the criminal, where satisfaction is made to the wounded honor of the law and the authority of the lawgiver, justice, though it admits of his discharge, yet no otherwise requires it, than as it may have been matter of promise to the substitute (Fuller’s Works, vol. iv., pp. 101–4).

The preceding statements prove that a broad line of distinction exists between a moral and a pecuniary satisfaction. They exhibit very clearly the nature of the latter kind of satisfaction, and show that the satisfaction of Christ cannot have been of this description. The amount of the statements may be thus shortly given. A pecuniary representative cannot be refused—a pecuniary satisfaction is made to an individual in! his private character–it precludes the possibility of forgiveness—and, consequently, gives the individual represented a right to demand his discharge. What sober-minded man, to adopt Mr. Fuller’s language, will venture to say that any of these notions accord with the Scripture representations of the substitution and satisfaction of Christ? The passing remark of this writer, that if sin were literally a debt, it might have been remitted by God without any satisfaction, is especially worthy of attention. Such a representation of sin does most certainly destroy the necessity of atonement altogether! For what is there to forbid the most honorable and upright judge in the world to remit any personal debts which an individual may have contracted with him? In no degree would his character, as a lover of integrity and moral virtue in general, be compromised thereby; because a man may always forego his own private rights, if he chooses so to do: or, if he be restrained on the ground that his family and friends would suffer were he to forego them, he ceases to act as an individual. The rights which he struggles to retain are no longer his own personal rights. He acts as a public character; and his conduct is governed by the principles which regulate moral government in general.

George Payne, Lectures on Divine Sovereignty, Election, the Atonement, Justification, and Regeneration (Hamilton, Adams, and Co . and Roberts, Exeter, 1836), 142–45. [Some reformatting; footnote values modernized; some spelling modernized; and underlining mine.]

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Andrew Robertson on the Distinction between Pecuniary and Penal Satisfaction: In Relation to the Sufficiency of the Atonement

The following is a short essay on the sufficiency of the atonement while setting out the proper distinctions between pecuniary and penal categories.

Appendix G.

We insert here the following Extract from a Draft of an Overture pared and published by a Committee of the Associate Reformed Synod, America, for the purpose of illustrating and defending the Doctrine of the Westminster Confession of Faith. The Committee were, Rev. Dr John Mason, Messrs Robert Annan and John Smith. The writer appears to be Mr R. Annan, Philadelphia. 1787.

That there is a sufficiency in the atonement of Jesus Christ for all men, is undoubtedly a great and glorious truth. But the sufficiency of his death, and extent of it, must be considered in a twofold light; first, either with relation to the nature of sin; or, secondly, the number of sinners pardoned and saved. That the necessity of Christ’s infinite atonement does not arise from the number, but the nature of sin,—or that the very nature of sin itself requires an infinite atonement in order to its honorable remission, cannot be denied by men of sound understandings. Such an atonement is indispensably necessary to the pardon of one act of sin, and the salvation of one sinner, consistently with the glory of the Supreme Lawgiver, the obligation of his law, and sustentation of his government; and the end thereof may be completely gained in the salvation of one. Sin, though distinguished into various acts, is in itself one thing,—one corrupt principle—one vicious habit; it is enmity against God,—it is spiritual darkness, spiritual death, spiritual bondage. Therefore the infinite sufficiency of Christ’s death is necessary to the pardon of one sin, and the salvation of one sinner; and, indeed, if this were not the case, it would not be necessary to the pardon of any supposed number, because numbers do not vary nature, nor degrees alter species or kind.

The dispute about the extent of the death of Christ, therefore, can take place only on the second question, to wit, the number of sinners to be saved by it. That it is sufficient for the salivation of all men is not denied by any; and doubtless all men would be saved by it, if it were accepted by them. The sacred writings clearly teach this; and on this ground the revelation and offer of it to all men must rest.

When we speak of the sufficiency of the death and satisfaction of Christ in this last sense, perhaps we err in regulating our ideas on this great subject by the idea of commutation or commercial justice among men. As a thousand pounds in specie, by whomsoever paid, whether by the surety or debtor, is sufficient to cancel a bond or discharge a debt of that amount. But it is manifest no such ideas, strictly taken, ought to be admitted here. Let us say it with reverence, God is not a merchant. Transferable property is out of the question. The rectoral justice of the Supreme Governor of the universe is the subject to which we must fix our attention. And the only proper idea we can form of the sufficiency of the atonement of Christ is this—Is it a sufficient display of the glory of the Divine character,—of his holiness, justice, hatred of sin, and goodness as a moral Governor? Is it sufficient to maintain the authority and obligation of his law, sustain the moral system, and give energy to his government over rational and free agents, while he pardons sin and receives the rebel into favour? After forming this idea of it, which is certainly the true and just one, there arises another question: In the room of what creatures is it morally fit and proper to admit this atonement? In answer to the question, let it be observed, that as all men were comprehended in Adam, in a double sense, both as the natural root from which they all proceed, and as their representative in the. first covenant,—as they are all originally under one law or covenant, as sin is one and the same thing in them all, and as one and the same penalty is due to them all; and furthermore, as the Son of God assumed the common nature of them all—was made under the very same law which they had all broken, and not only fulfilled the obedience required by the precepts, but also endured the penalty of that very law which they had violated, and to which penalty they had by transgression exposed themselves,—there is doubtless a sufficiency in his death for them all, that is, it would comport with the glory of the Divine character, the sustentation of his government, the obligation and honor of his law, and the good of the rational and moral system, to save them all, provided they all accepted of Christ’s atonement, yielded submission to him, and returned to God by him. In the sense it may be said, “Christ tasted death for every man—is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world and God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” And this lays a sufficient foundation for that injunction, “Go, preach the gospel to every creature: he that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned. Go, speak to the people all the words of this life.” Every legal bar and obstruction in the way of the salvation of all men is removed; let them only accept and submit to Jesus Christ as their Prophet, Priest, and King. All things are ready, and all are made welcome to the marriage and the marriage supper.

But while we allow the sufficiency of the atonement of Christ for the salvation of all men, at the same time, it is absolutely certain, both from the testimony of God’s word, and from fact and experience, that many men reject it, and die rejecting it. Now, did God design to save, by the death of his Son, those who finally reject it? Is there a sufficiency in the death of Christ to save men, whether they receive or reject the benefit of it? Most certainly not. The gospel constitution assures us, that such, instead of being saved by it, will find this rejection infinitely to aggravate their guilt and condemnation. Christ will profit them nothing. “He that believeth not shall be damned.” Did Christ, then, die at an absolute uncertainty whether any should be saved by his death or not? Surely not. A number have been saved by it, and many more shall be so. “But known unto God are all his works from the beginning.” The Scriptures most f d y declare that a number were predestinated to life by Jesus Christ; a number were given to Christ, ” and all that the Father hath given to him shall come to him.” God determined such, not only the offer of Christ and salvation, but also grace to believe and accept. In respect of its sufficiency, then, the death of Christ bears a relation to all men. The door of hope has been opened to all to enter, or to believe and accept; and he that believeth shall be saved” But in respect of the intention of real and actual salvation, he died only for the chosen, or those who were given to him, and whom the Father will draw, by rich, free, and unmerited grace. In virtue of the atonement of Christ, it is consistent with the honor of God, yea, redounds much to his glory, to save all who believe and obey the gospel, and none else. But shall we suppose he did not know who should finally do so? How can that be possible, since, it is certain, whenever any does so, it is owing to the interposition of sovereign grace? “By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God.” As for the others, he determined to leave them finally to their own free choice, except that he strives with them in the dispensation of his word and ordinances, and by the more ordinary operations of hi Spirit, still declaring that whosoever believeth on Christ shall not perish. They are thus inexcusable; for the gospel is as rational an address to the rational powers of men, as ever was made to rational creatures; and the only reason why they are not saved, is became they will not. “Ye will not come to me,” says Christ, “that ye might have life.”

Andrew Robertson, History of the Atonement Controversy, in Connexion with The Secession Church, From its Origin to the Present Time (Edinburgh: William Oliphant and Sons, 1846), 365–68.

Note: We have seen a few references to the proper distinctions between pecuniary and satisfactions coming out of Marrow and early Secession literature. Clearly thinkers at this time had become sensitive to the problematics of converting the penal categories into pecuniary ones.

Original post here (click).