Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on the Double Payment/Double Jeopardy Fallacy

If the Atonement be limited in Design, it must be restricted in the Offer
There is still another ground on which it is urged that Augustinians cannot consistently preach the gospel to every creature. Augustinians teach, it is urged, that the work of Christ is a satisfaction to divine justice. From this it follows that justice cannot condemn those for whose sins it has been satisfied. It cannot demand that satisfaction twice, first from the substitute and then from the sinner himself. This would be manifestly unjust, far worse than demanding no punishment at all. From this it is inferred that the satisfaction or righteousness of Christ, if the ground on which a sinner may be forgiven, is the ground on which he must be forgiven. It is not the ground on which he may be forgiven, unless it is the ground on which he must be forgiven. If the atonement be limited in design it must be limited in its nature, and if limited in its nature it must be limited in its offer.

This objection again arises from confounding a pecuniary and a judicial satisfaction between which Augustinians are so careful to discriminate. This distinction has already been presented on a previous page (470). There is no grace in accepting a pecuniary satisfaction. It cannot be refused. It ipso facto liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free; and that without any condition. Nothing of this is true in the case of judicial satisfaction. If a substitute be provided and accepted it is a matter of grace. His satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate. It may accrue to the benefit of those for whom it is made at once or at a remote period; completely or gradually; on conditions or unconditionally; or it may never benefit them at all unless the condition on which its application is suspended be performed. These facts are universally admitted by those who hold that the work of Christ was a true and perfect satisfaction to divine justice. The application of its benefits is determined by the covenant between the Father and the Son. Those for whom it was specially rendered are not justified from eternity; they are not born in a justified state; they are by nature, or birth, the children of wrath even as others. To be the children of wrath is to be justly exposed to divine wrath. They remain in this state of exposure until they believe, and should they die (unless in infancy) before they believe they would inevitably perish notwithstanding the satisfaction made for their sins. It is the stipulations of the covenant which forbid such a result. Such being the nature of the judicial satisfaction rendered by Christ to the law, under which all men are placed, it may be sincerely offered to all men with the assurance that if they believe it shall accrue to their salvation. His work being specially designed for the salvation of his own people, renders, through the conditions of the covenant, that event certain; but this is perfectly consistent with its being made the ground of the general offer of the gospel. Lutherans and Reformed agree entirely, as before stated, in their views of the nature of the satisfaction of Christ, and consequently, so far as that point is concerned, there is the same foundation for the general offer of the gospel according to either scheme. What the Reformed or Augustinians hold about election does not affect the nature of the atonement. That remains the same whether designed for the elect or for all mankind. It does not derive its nature from the secret purpose of God as to its application.

Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 2:557–58.

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A. A. Hodge (1823–1886) on the Distinction between Pecuniary and Penal Satisfaction

II. The Difference between a penal and a pecuniary satisfaction. These differ precisely as do crime and debt, things and persons, and therefore the distinction is both obvious and important. Many, who either are incapable of understanding the question, are ignorant of its history, or who are unscrupulous as to the manner in which they conduct controversy, are continually charging our doctrine with the folly of representing the sacrifice of Christ as a purely commercial transaction, in which so much was given for so much, and in which God was in such a sense recompensed for his favours to us that however much gratitude we may owe to Christ, we owe on this behalf none to God. Long ago the doctrine of the Reformed Churches was unanswerably vindicated from such puerile charges by all its most authoritative expounders. “Here the twofold solution, concerning which jurists treat, should be accurately distinguished. The one, which ipso facto liberates the debtor or criminal because that very thing which was owed is paid, whether it was done by the debtor or by another in his name. The other, which ipso facto does not liberate, since not at all the very thing which was owed, but an equivalent, is paid, which, although it does not thoroughly and ipso facto discharge the obligation, yet having been accepted—since it might be refused—is regarded as a satisfaction. This distinction holds between a pecuniary and a penal indebtedness. For in a pecuniary debt the payment of the thing owed ipso facto liberates the debtor from all obligations whatsoever, because here the point is not who pays, but what is paid. Hence the creditor, the payment being accepted, is never said to extend toward the debtor any indulgence or remission, because he has received all that was owed him. But the case is different with respect to a penal debt, because in this case the obligation respects the person as well as the thing; the demand is upon the person who pays as well as the thing paid; i. e., that the penalty should be suffered by the person sinning; for as the law demands personal and proper obedience, so it exacts personal enduring of the penalty. Therefore, in order that a criminal should be absolved—a vicarious satisfaction being rendered by another hand—it is necessary that there should intervene a sovereign act of the supreme law-giver, which, with respect to the law, is called relaxation, and with respect to the debtor is called remission, because the personal endurance of the penalty is remitted, and a vicarious endurance of it is accepted in its stead. Hence it clearly appears that in this work (of Redemption) remission and satisfaction are perfectly consistent with each other, because there is satisfaction in the endurance of the punishment which Christ bore, and there is remission in the acceptance of a vicarious victim. The satisfaction respects Christ, from whom God demanded the very same punishment, as to kind of punishment, though not as to the degree nor as to the nature of the sufferings which the law denounced upon us. The remission respects believers, to whom God remits the personal, while he admits the vicarious, punishment. And thus appears the admirable reconciliation of justice and mercy—justice which executes itself upon the sin, and mercy which is exercised towards the sinner. Satisfaction is rendered to the justice of God by the Sponsor, and remission is granted to us by God” (Turretin, [Institutio Theologiae Elencticae,] Locus XIV. Quaestio 10, §[8; see below]).

Hence pecuniary satisfaction differs from penal thus: (a.) In debt, the demand terminates upon the thing due. In crime, the legal demand for punishment is upon the person of the criminal. (b.) In debt, the demand is for the precise thing due—the exact quid pro quo, and nothing else. In crime, the demand is for that kind, degree and duration of suffering which the law—i. e., absolute and omniscient justice—demands in each specific case, the person suffering and the sin to be expiated both being considered. (c.) In debt, the payment of the thing due, by whomsoever it may be made, ipso facto liberates the debtor, and instantly extinguishes all the claims of the creditor, and his release of the debtor is no matter of grace. In crime, a vicarious suffering of the penalty is admissible only at the absolute discretion of the sovereign; remission is a matter of grace; the rights acquired by the vicarious endurance of penalty all accrue to the sponsor; and the claims of law upon the sinner are not ipso facto dissolved by such a satisfaction, but remission accrues to the designed beneficiaries only at such times and on such conditions as have been determined by the will of the sovereign, or agreed upon between the sovereign and the sponsor.

Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Atonement (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1867), 34–37.

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Here is the section from Francis Turretin (1623–1687) that Hodge referenced above:

VIII. However, a twofold payment (noticed by jurists) must be accurately distinguished here. One “by the very act of payment sets at liberty” the guilty and the debtor, when the very thing is paid which is in the obligation, whether the payment is made by the debtor himself or by a surety in his name. Another in which “the mere act of payment is not sufficient to liberate the debtor.” For the payment is not the same thing precisely which is demanded in the obligation, but an equivalent, which although it does not by the very deed take away the obligation, yet being admitted (when it might be refused) is regarded as a satisfaction. In a pecuniary and a penal debt, this is evident. In a pecuniary debt, the payment of the debt by the very act frees the debtor (by whomsover the payment is made) because the person who pays is not attended to here, but only what is paid. Hence the creditor (payment being received) is not said to have treated the debtor with indulgence and to have forgiven the debt because he has received just as much as was due to him. But in a penal debt the case is different because the obligation regards not only things but persons (i.e., not only what is paid, but also him who pays, so that the punishment may be borne by the transgressor). For as the law demands individual personal obedience, so it also exacts a like punishment. Therefore in order that the guilty person may be freed by another’s or a vicarious satisfaction, the act of the judge and ruler ought to come in. That act is called “relaxation” (in relation to the law). In relaxation to the debtor or guilty person, it is called pardon because his personal punishment is dispensed with a vicarious punishment admitted and accepted in its place. However, because the subject under discussion (sin) does not have only a relation to debt, but also to criminality, the satisfaction is not of that kind (which by the act itself frees the debtor) unless the forbearance (epieikeia) and remission of the Judge comes in. The very thing itself which is in the obligation is not paid (viz., a personal enduring of the punishment), which the law according to strict justice (akribodikaion) demands, but only a vicarious suffering. Hence it clearly appears how well remission and satisfaction here agree with each other whatever outcry our opponents may raise against it. For in the enduring of punishment suffered by Christ, there is satisfaction, but in the admission and acceptance of a substitute, remission. The former respects Christ, from whom God demands a punishment, not numerically but specifically the same with that which we owed. But the latter respects believers, whom God frees from punishment in their own persons, while he admits a substitute. Thus we see how admirably mercy is tempered with justice—justice since it is exercised against sin and mercy exercised towards the sinner. Satisfaction is made to the justice of God by a surety and remission given to us by God.

Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3 vols., ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1992–1997), 2:419; Institutio Theologiae Elencticae, 14.10.8.

Joseph Bellamy (1719–1790) on the Antinomian Assumptions of God as Creditor and Sin as Debt

Remark 5. Some of the peculiar principles of the Antinomians seem to take their rise from wrong notions of the nature of satisfaction for sin. They seem to have no right notions of the moral perfections of God, and of the natural obligations we are under to him, nor any right apprehensions of the nature and ends of moral government, nor any ideas of the grounds, nature, and ends of satisfaction for sin; a right sense of which things, tends powerfully to promote a holy fear, and reverential awe of the dread Majesty of heaven and earth; a sense of the infinite evil of sin: brokenness of heart, tenderness of conscience; a humble, holy, watchful, prayerful temper and life, as well as to prepare the way for faith in the blood of Christ. But they seem to have no right apprehensions of these things. They seem to consider God merely under the notion of a creditor, and us merely under the notion of debtors; and to suppose, when Christ upon the cross said, ”It is finished,” he then paid the whole debt of the elect, and saw the book crossed, whereby all their sins were actually blotted out and forgiven; and now, all that remains is for the Holy Spirit immediately to reveal it to one and another that he is elected; that for him Christ died, and that his sins are all pardoned; which revelation he is firmly to believe, and never again to doubt of; and this they call faith. From which it seems they understand nothing rightly about God or Christ, the law or gospel. For nothing is more evident than that God is, in Scripture, considered as righteous Governor of the world, and we as criminals, guilty before him; and the evident design of Christ’s death was, to be a propitiation for sin, to declare and manifest God’s righteousness, that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believes in Jesus. (Rom. iii. 9–26.) And the gospel knows nothing about a sinner’s being justified in any other way than by faith, and by consequence, in order of nature, not till after faith. The gospel knows nothing about satisfaction for sin, in their sense; but every where teaches that the elect, as well as others, are equally under condemnation and the wrath of God; yea, are children of wrath while unbelievers, (John iii. IS. 36. Eph. ii. 3. Acts iii. 19.)

Again; while they consider God merely under the character of a creditor, and us merely as debtors, and Christ as paying the whole debt of the elect; now, because Christ obeyed the law, as well as suffered its penalty, therefore they seem to think that Christ has done all their duty, so that now they have nothing to do but firmly to believe that Christ has done all: they have nothing to do with the law,—no, not so much as to be their rule to live by,—but are set at full liberty from all obligations to any duty whatsoever; not understanding that “Christ gave himself to redeem his people from all iniquity, and purify them to himself, a peculiar people, zealous of good works,” and not understanding that our natural obligations to perfect obedience are not capable of being dissolved, (Matt. v. 17,) and not understanding that our obligations to all holy living are mightily increased by the grace of the gospel. (Rom. xii. 1.) Indeed, they seem to understand nothing rightly, but to view every thing in a wrong light; and instead of considering Christ as a friend to holiness, as one “that loves righteousness and hates iniquity,” they make him “a minister of sin,” and turn the grace of God into wantonness. All their notions tend to render their consciences insensible of the evil of sin: to cherish spiritual pride and carnal security, and to open a door to all ungodliness.

Joseph Bellamy, “True Religion Delineated,” in The Works of Joseph Bellamy, 2 vols. (Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, 1853), 1:290–91. [Some spelling modernized and underlining mine.]

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Note: The Antinomian conception of satisfaction and salvation arose out of the prior pecuniary categories present in such works as John Owen’s Death of Death. The Antinomians simply extended those same pecuniary assumptions and thereby thinned out the responsibility of the individual. The intent was that God should be magnified, and man minimized. Interestingly, many modern advocates of limited expiation and limited imputation assume the same sort of efficacy, making almost identical claims with regard to what Christ accomplished on the cross. Indeed, in some circles it sounds more pious and more Reformed to speak this way. The problem is, the language and sentiment has for their sources two critical theological departures. The one being Antinomianism, the other being the recasting of the properly penal satisfaction of Christ, such that it is viewed as having the identical efficacy entailed in proper pecuniary satisfactions: the latter laid the foundation for the former. However, the end result is that God is not magnified but distorted, and the responsibility and role of the individual is not minimized but disappears.

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R. L. Dabney (1820–1898): A Sharp Lesson on the Negative Inference fallacy

In proof of the general correctness of this theory of the extent of the Atonement, we should attach but partial force to some of the arguments advanced by Symington and others, or even by Turrettin. e. g. That Christ says, He died “for His sheep,” for “His Church,” for “His friends,” &c., is not of itself conclusive. The proof of a proposition does not disprove its converse. All the force which we could properly attach to this class of passages is the probability arising from the frequent and emphatic repetition of this affirmative statement as to a definite object.

R. L. Dabney, Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology, Second Edition. (St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company, 1878), 521.

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Richard Muller on Solutio, Solutio Idem, and Solutio Tantundem

solutio: solution, explanation, payment. In the doctrine of the death of Christ, a distinction is sometimes made between regarding his payment for sin as a solutio idem or solutio eiusdem, a payment in the same kind, namely, an exact or precise payment; or a solutio tantundem or solutio tantidem, a payment of the same value, namely, an accepted equivalent. Thus, in the first case, the solutio idem or eiusdem, Christ’s death would be regarded as a full satisfaction, effective in and of itself because it is understood to be the same (idem) as the debt. In the second case, the solutio tantundem or tantidem, as proposed by Grotius and some of the Reformed, Christ’s satisfaction is willed by God as an acceptable payment, albeit not absolutely identical to the offense but of the same value. The concept of a solutio tantundem was crucial to Grotius’s defense of the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction against the Socinians, who had argued the unacceptability of satisfaction theory on the ground that Christ’s suffering was not the same as the penalty of death for sin. Whereas Grotius can be read as viewing the tantundem as an acceptation of Christ’s death as equivalent, Reformed advocates of this solution typically insisted on the tantundem as fully equivalent in value. See acceptatio; acceptilatio.

Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), 339.

William Symington (1795–1862): Christ Did Not Suffer So Much For So Much Sin

This brings us directly to the subject of this section, which is to inquire what it was about the sacrifice of Christ which rendered it an adequate cause to produce the effect of human salvation; that is to say, what it is that constitutes the moral worth or value of Christ’s atonement.

The value of Christ’s atonement we conceive to arise, not from the nature, or intensity, or continuance of his sufferings. The work of Jesus was not a mere commercial affair of debt and payment. We have no conception that, had the number of those for whom he suffered been greater than it was, or had their sins been more numerous or more aggravated than they were, his sufferings must have been proportionably increased. Neither can we subscribe to the notion that one pang or pain of all that he endured was itself sufficient to effect atonement. We conceive, on the contrary, that he suffered nothing but what was necessary, that if less could have sufficed less would have been required; while, on the other hand, the intrinsic worth of what he actually endured was such as to render it sufficient for the salvation of many more than shall be ultimately saved, had God only seen meet to extend to them his mercy in Christ Jesus. The sufferings of Christ we regard as a moral satisfaction to the law and government of God, which would have been necessary had there been only one to be saved, and which would have been found sufficient had the whole human race, without exception, been to rank among the redeemed. Just as the arrangement which exists for the outward illumination of our globe, would have been required had there been but one inhabitant to reap the benefit presently enjoyed, and would have been sufficient had there been many more millions in existence than actually inhabit the earth. The worth or value of Christ’s atoning sacrifice we conceive to have arisen, not from one circumstance alone, but from several circumstances combined, none of which can be dispensed with in forming a proper estimate on the subject. These circumstances we shall now attempt to unfold.

I. The first is the dignity of the Saviour’s person.

He who, in making atonement, is at once the priest and the sacrifice, is divine. He is the Son of God, the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person. He is God himself, co-equal with the Father, Jehovah’s fellow. Titles which involve essential dignity are unhesitatingly ascribed to him. He is spoken of as possessing all the necessary attributes of Deity. Works which belong only to God, are said to be performed by him. And the highest forms of divine worship are used by all moral creatures, in doing him homage. The truth of these assertions we must be permitted to take for granted, as to exhibit even an outline of their evidence would lead us into an improper digression. The doctrine of Christ’s dignity is prominently set forth in the volume of revealed truth. It is the glory of Christianity. It sparkles, like a radiant gem, in every part of the sacred field. It invests the whole Christian system with heavenly beauty. It imparts a peculiar grandeur and sublimity to the doctrines of the cross.

From the dignity of the party offended by man’s sin, it was requisite that he, who should successfully transact for pardon, should possess a corresponding elevation of character. He who is offended is the infinite Jehovah, the great God of heaven and of earth. It is the infinite Majesty whose honor has been violated; it is the throne of the Eternal whose stability and authority have been invaded. To effect reconciliation, in such a case, is a work to which no man, no angel, no superangelic creature is adequate. No priest of less personal consequence than the Lord of glory, is competent to the office of appeasing the wrath of the high and lofty One who inhabiteth eternity. But we have such an High Priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the heavens.

The sacrifice by which atonement is made for offences of infinite moral turpitude, must be possessed of infinite moral worth. The relative value arising from divine appointment is not enough; else it could never have been said, “It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats could take away sin.” The blood of inferior animals was as capable as any other of all the worth which mere appointment can impart. But an intrinsic worth was required, which could be possessed by nothing short of “blood divine.” Hence the sacrifice of Christ is so often spoken of in scripture as being himself. “Christ has loved us and given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God.—Who gave himself a ransom for all.—When he had by himself purged our sins.—He offered up himself.—He appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.”¹

As the substance of Christ’s atoning sacrifice consisted in his sufferings or death, it has been alleged that its intrinsic worth could be nothing more than human, as his human nature alone could suffer and die. But the close and inseparable union subsisting between the divine and human natures in the person of the Son of God is here to be remembered. Although the human nature alone could either suffer or die, it was the Son of God, as possessed of this nature, who endured the sufferings and died the death of the cross. The possession of a human nature qualified him for suffering; the divinity of his person gave to his suffering a worth equivalent to its own dignity. Although the human nature was alone capable of suffering, it was nevertheless the person to whom this nature belonged who suffered. It may be thought that at this rate, as the person was divine, such an assertion involves the blasphemy that Deity suffered. By no means. When a person suffers, it does not follow that he suffers in all that pertains to him. He may suffer in his property and not suffer in his honor; he may suffer in his happiness and not in his character; he may suffer in his body and not in his soul; still it is the person who suffers. So, in the case before us, while the Son of God suffers in his human nature it is still the person which suffers. If, before we are entitled to say that a person suffers, all that pertains to him must suffer, it follows that we can never say a person dies, as the soul, an essential constituent part of the person, never dies.

But, granting that it is the person who suffers, it may still be said that the value of these sufferings is to be estimated only by the nature of that in which he suffers. When a martyr suffers death, as it is the body only that dies, there cannot belong to his death a worth proportioned to his soul. In like manner, when Christ suffers, as Deity cannot suffer, his sufferings, it may be said, can possess only the worth of humanity. But this is to leave out of consideration altogether a circumstance which is allowed by all to have the effect of increasing the value of certain acts and sufferings. The circumstance to which I refer is dignity of character. There are some things which are of the same value, by whomsoever performed. Money, for example, paid by a prince, is of no more mercantile value than money paid by any other man. But there are other things in which the case is widely different, their value depending, in some measure, on the dignity of him by whom they are performed. The relative value of certain actions depends on the rank in the scale of intellectual, or moral, or social being of the person who performs them. To the action of an inferior animal we attach less value than to that of a human creature;—to that of a man less, again, than to that of an angel. On the same principle, the action of a peasant and that of a king may differ materially, with regard to relative worth. In one point of view, the life of a slave and the life of a monarch are of equal value; they are both human creatures. But, in another point of view, the life of a king is of far greater value than the life of a slave: and the act of laying down his life involves a higher degree of worth in the one than in the other. This distinction is recognized in the address of the people to king David, when he would go forth with them to battle:—” Thou shalt not go forth: for if we flee away, they will not care for us; neither if half of us die, will they care for us; but now thou art worth ten thousand of us.”² For a king to submit to excruciating tortures and an ignominious death, with a view to save some one of his subjects, will be reckoned by all a more meritorious piece of conduct than if such had been submitted to by one who held the place merely of a fellow subject. Yet here it might be said, it is humanity and not royalty which suffers, and why attach to it a value arising from the latter, rather than confine it to that which springs from the former circumstance? The case is parallel to that of which we are now speaking. The humanity of Christ alone could either suffer or die, but that humanity belonged to a person who is divine, and this gave to his sufferings and death the value of divinity.³

How it comes to pass, that the personal dignity of the sufferer conveys to the sufferings of his humanity a worth proportioned to him who suffers rather than to that which suffers, we pretend not fully to explain. The above observations, however, serve to show that the principle on which this is affirmed, is one on which we are not altogether unaccustomed to reason. It is not meant to be inferred that any analogies, such as that resorted to above, can give us a complete idea of the nature of a case which is transcendently and awfully peculiar. It is enough if they serve to neutralize the objections of such as are disposed to cavil at the truth. On a subject of this nature, it ill becomes us to speak either with carelessness or precipitation. It is to be approached only with cautious reverence. Here, if anywhere, we should be careful to be “lowly wise.” Yet we may be permitted to show the reasonableness of a doctrine, and to expose the temerity and presumption of its adversaries, without laying ourselves open to the charge of being wise above what is written. The following statement may not altogether be without its use, in shedding a ray of light on this acknowledgedly great and profound mystery:—A person only can perform moral acts: The human nature of Christ possessed no personal subsistence: Of course, although the human nature of Christ alone could either suffer or obey, the obedience and sufferings of his humanity, viewed in themselves could have no moral character: To give them a moral character they must be viewed in connection with his person: Whence it follows that, the obedience and sufferings of Christ, physically considered, possessed only the worth of humanity, but morally considered possessed a worth proportioned to the dignity of his divine person. Now, the sufferings and death of Christ for the sins of his people were of a moral character, being endured with a view to meet the claims of the divine moral government, to satisfy the law and justice of God. It follows that there attached to them all the value which divine dignity could impart.⁴

But we are more concerned with the evidence of the fact, than with the explanation of the mode, of this great and important truth. Those who hold the doctrine of Christ’s divinity, can never hesitate to admit that the sufficiency or efficacy of his atonement springs from the supreme dignity of his person as the Son of God. The validity of his sacrifice takes its rise from his true and essential divinity. To this the testimony of Scripture is distinctly borne. The epistle to the Hebrews, which treats professedly of the insufficiency of the legal sacrifices, and the intrinsic validity of that of Christ, commences with an elaborate demonstration of Christ’s divinity, as the basis on which the subsequent reasoning is made to rest. The High Priest of the Christian profession is explicitly shown to be the brightness of the Father’s glory and the express image of his person; to be much better than the angels; to be God whose throne is forever and ever; to be Jehovah who laid the foundations of the earth, who shall remain when all else has perished, who is the same and his years shall not fail. While, in another part of the book, the blood of Christ is represented as deriving its superiority over the ceremonial sacrifices, from its being offered “through the Eternal Spirit”—a phrase understood by some of our most eminent critics and divines to refer to the divine dignity of his person. “How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the Eternal Spirit offered himself without spot of God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God.”⁵ It is because Jesus Christ is God’s Son that his blood possesses intrinsic validity to cleanse from all sin. The value of the gift and the sufficiency of the propitiatory sacrifice arise from the same circumstance. “God sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.”⁶

II. But this is not all. Relationship of nature to those for whom the atonement was made, is an essential element in its validity.

Christ required to be real and proper man, as much as the true God. To qualify him for making atonement he must possess opposite attributes, a frail and mortal nature combined with ineffable dignity of person. We allude not now to the necessity of the incarnation to fit the Messiah for suffering, to render him susceptible of pain and death, to make the offering of himself as a sacrifice a thing possible. We refer rather to the possession of human nature as imparting a character of worth or validity to what he did. This was requisite, not more to enable him to suffer, than to impart to his sufferings an essential value in the estimation of the divine law. Had the work of our redemption been a mere mercantile transaction, it mattered not by whom the price might have been paid. But being a moral satisfaction to the law of God for the sins of men, there existed a moral fitness or necessity that the satisfaction should be made by one in the nature of those who had sinned and were to be redeemed. The redeemer behooved, as of old, to be a kinsman, a brother. Without this, neither could the moral government of God be vindicated, nor the glory of the divine Lawgiver maintained, nor the principles of the law upheld. The law in its precept was suited to man, and in its curse it had a claim upon man. Its requirements were such as man only could fulfil; its penalty such as one possessing the nature of man only could bear. The penalty was suffering even unto death; and no angel, no one who had not a body as well as a soul, could die. The death only of a man could possess a moral and legal congruity to the curse of a law given to man and broken by man. It was not, then, merely to qualify him for suffering that the Messiah took upon him the nature of man, but to qualify him for such suffering as should possess validity in the eye of the divine law. But he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified must be all of one.⁷ Therefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might make reconciliation for the sins of the people. Since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. The serpent’s head could be bruised, only by the seed of the woman.⁸
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1. Eph. 5:2; 1 Tim. 2:6; Heb. 1:3; 7:27; 9:26.
2. 2 Sam. 18:3.
3. “To suppose, because humanity only is capable of suffering, that therefore humanity only is necessary to atonement, is to render dignity of character of no account. When Zeleucus, one of the Grecian kings, had made a law against adultery, that whosoever was guilty of this crime should lose both his eyes, his own son is said to have been the first transgressor. To preserve the honor of the law, and at the same time to save his own son from total blindness, the father had recourse to an expedient of losing one of his own eyes, and his son one of his. This expedient, though it did not conform to the letter of the law, yet was well adapted to preserve the spirit of it, as it served to evince to the nation the determination of the king to punish adultery, as much, perhaps more than if the sentence had been put into execution against the offender. But if instead of this he had appointed that one eye of an animal should be put out in order to save that of his son, or if a common subject had offered to lose an eye, would either have answered the purpose? The animal and the subject were each possessed of an eye, as well as the sovereign. It might be added, too, that it was mere bodily pain; and seeing it was in the body only that this penalty could be endured, any being that possessed a body was equally capable of enduring it. True, they might endure it, but would their suffering answer the same end? Would it have satisfied justice? Would it have had the same effect upon the nation, or tended equally to restore the tone of injured authority?”—Works of Andrew Fuller, vol. v. p. 565.
4. On this delicate point, I beg to confirm the view I have given, by referring the reader to the following paragraphs by Dr. Pye Smith.
“I. The assumption of human nature by the eternal word, who is God, was the act of an infinite mind, knowing, intending, and contemplating all the results of that act of assumption, through the period of the designed humiliation and for ever. To the divine mind, nearness and remoteness of time or space are equal. Consequently, as the actual assumption of human nature was the first result of the omnipotent will, so the same act, or volition, must equally have carried forwards and communicated its original divine value to all the subsequent moral and mediatorial acts of the incarnate Saviour.
“II. The union of the divine and human natures, in his person, was constant and invariable. The Scriptures afford us no reason to think that the Messiah’s human nature, though retaining always its essential properties, had ever a separate subsistence. To the mother of Jesus it was announced, ‘The holy Being which is born of thee, shall be called the Son of God:’ and according to the prophetic declaration, as soon as men could say, ‘Unto us a child is born,’ so soon was it the fact that his name was called ‘The Wonderful, the Counsellor, the Mighty God.’ It was the Mediator, in his whole person, that acted for the salvation of man; though it was impossible that the divine nature could be subject to suffering.
“From these two positions I infer a third, which I venture to propose, as an unexceptionable mode of stating this important, though profound and difficult subject:—
“III. All the acts of our Lord Jesus Christ that were physical, or merely intellectual, were acts of his human nature alone, being necessary to the subsistence of a human nature: but all his moral acts, and all the moral qualities of his complex acts; or, in other terms, all that he did in and for the execution of his mediatorial office and work,—were impressed with the essential dignity and moral value of his divine perfection.
“These reasons appear to me sufficient to authorize our attributing to this holy sacrifice, a value properly infinite, on account of the divine nature “of him who offered it. A most important conclusion! Rich in blessing to the contrite sinner: full of joy to the obedient believer.”—Disc, on Sac., pp. 69–71.
5. Heb. 9:14.
6. 1 John 4:10.
7. i. e. all of one nature.
8. Heb. 2:11, 17; 1 Cor. 15:21: Gen. 3:15.

William Symington, On the Atonement and Intercession of Jesus Christ, Third Edition. (New York: Robert Carter, 1847), 162–170.

Note: In opposition to the standard Reformed consensus on this, the reader may be interested to read Tom Nettles’s assertion that Christ did, indeed, suffer for so much sin, and could have suffered more for more sin: here.

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William J. Styles (1842–1914) on Christ Suffering So Much for So Much Sin

1)

Christ’s sufferings
proportionate to His people’s
guilt, the ground of the
sufficiency of His work.

We believe that as the death of the Lord Jesus was penal (that is to say inflicted on Him in punishment for the sins of His people,) His vicarious agonies were proportioned to their guilt, and that He suffered at the hands of impartial Justice what they in their own persons must otherwise have endured in the place of endless woe, and that thus the measure of His sufferings rendered His oblation gloriously SUFFICIENT for the great ends contemplated in the covenant of grace.

William Jeyes Styles, A Manual of Faith and Practice, Designed for Young and Enquiring Christians (London: Printed by J. Briscoe, Banner Street, Finsbury, E.C., 1897), 43. [Some spelling modernized; some reformatting; and underlining mine.]

2)

ADDENDA TO CHAPTER 10.

No. E.—Some erroneous views of the Atonement.

….We differ from those who hold that “the dignity of Christ’s person,” and the “agony which He endured,” “determines the merit of His work.” No Scripture that we are aware of is adduced in favour of this assertion. It will therefore suffice to state that it has been duly considered and rejected by those whom we regard as authorities—who hold that the efficacy of the atonement lies in our Lord’s having so suffered, in His precious and inexplicable complexity, for the sins of His elect, as to satisfy divine justice on their behalf. Its worth lies neither in the glory of His person nor the circumstances of His passion, separately considered; but in His having suffered as the God-man, under the Divine wrath justly excited by the sins of His people.

“The merits of Christ,” says William Palmer, “consist in the worth of His person drawn out in acts of obedience unto death, which He rendered as a public person to the Law.” The glory of the Lord’s person indeed characterized His atoning work had He not been the infinite God, not one sinner would have been saved by His sufferings. This we concede. But "the essence of the atonement," again says William Palmer, "must not be confounded with the Divinity of Him who made it; for then the slightest pang would have sufficed, and a plenary punishment been avoided.”

We differ from those who deny that the sufferings of Christ were equivalent to the punishment due to the sins of the elect. No Scripture is, again, adduced to refute what has been esteemed a fundamental truth. It suffices, therefore, to state that John Stevens expresses his belief that "Christ’s sufferings were according to the number of His people" in a work which has been universally accepted in the denomination. It has been asked, "whether the Lord Jesus could have suffered more," and this, not particularly wise, question has been supposed to contain an argument as cogent as if it were the statement of a revealed fact. John Stevens has, however, shown that it is propounded in ignorance of the distinction that should be drawn between the act of dying and the sufferings that may attend a dying hour. Not from His death alone, but from His dying under such unique and momentous circumstances the merits of Christ’s oblation arose. It is certain that His sufferings resulted from the sins of the elect, and we as a Denomination hold that they were a legal equivalent to what the church must, but for Him, have suffered in Hell for ever.

We differ from those who hold that the value of the atonement is infinite, although its benefits are confined to his elect. While it is conceded by those to whom we refer, that the influence of Christ’s death extends only to those whose Head He is, it is insisted that we should discriminate between this, and its worth. Its worth is infinite; its influence restricted. This is the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic value of the atonement. "The indwelling Godhead of Emmanuel" we are told, "imprinted its own infinity upon the value of His oblation"; hence its intrinsic infinitude. Divine appointment restricts its actual efficacy; hence its extrinsic limitedness. Pedantic phraseology, however, in our judgment only tends to obscure the simplicity of divine truth, and we object to the employment of words that poor and plain men cannot understand. With William Palmer, we deem this distinction "indefensible." We believe the design, the worth and the application of the atonement to be co-extensive, regarding it, as in all respects, commensurate with the claims of justice on those for whom it was intended.

The above distinction we moreover hold to be human, needless, unscriptural, and misleading. It does not simplify the presentation of the gospel to sinners. It affords no comfort to anxious inquirers sighing under the burden of deplored sin; to whom infinite generalities bring no relief. Their question invariably is, not "has an atonement of unlimited value been provided?" but "Did Christ die for ME?" It magnifies neither the justice, nor the wisdom, nor the love of God, and introduces confusion into the beautifully harmonious, and coherent scheme of Divine salvation. On the other hand the doctrine of a just and sufficient atonement is, in all ways, adapted to the wants of sinners, while it reflects transcendent glory upon the God of all grace.

The assertion that they only can preach to sinners who are prepared to proclaim that the Atonement is a "bottomless abyss" is disproved by the fact that the gospel is never so presented in the Inspired volume. The assertion that an infinite atonement was needful, because sin is an infinite evil, is also untenable. Sin may be infinite in the language of hyperbole, when terms are not employed in their full and literal acceptation. Sin may be called infinite, relatively, for it is the rebellion of the soul against the infinite God. But sin personally considered is the act of finite creatures who cannot possibly give rise to what is infinite.

On examination it will be seen that the root of all objections to an atonement, limited both in design and efficacy, lies in dislike to the sovereignty of God. In determining the extent of His salvation He pleased Himself alone. The right to do this, proud reason invariably denies Him. Hence the many attacks upon the revelation of plans and proceedings, in all of which He claims and exercises His royal prerogative.

Our views accord with the Scriptures which invariably represent the satisfaction of Jesus, as the result of His sufferings as a complex person, when enduring the punishment adjudicated by equity to the sins that had been transferred to Him. It is granted that the complexity of Emmanuel invested Him with an infinite capacity for suffering, but where is it asserted that He suffered to the extent of that capacity?

All passages which refer to the cause of His sufferings, explicitly state that these had definite relation to accurately considered sins. "With His stripes," i.e., with stripes inflicted on Him, one by one, till the required number was reached, we are healed.” ”The Lord hath laid on Him," not the iniquity, or sin as sin, but, as in the margin, "the iniquities of us all." "For the transgressions of my people was He smitten." "The chastisement of our peace," i.e., such punishment as must be endured to ensure our peace, " was upon Him." He was delivered for our offenses.” "He died for our sins." "He suffered for us in the flesh." He "the just " one, died, INSTEAD of the "unjust ones." "He gave Himself for out sins." The wrath of God excited by our sins therefore caused His suffering, and to exhaust that measured wrath He suffered.

Now we must surely "believe in equity in relation to the atonement."—John Hazelton. We cannot but hold that impartial justice regulated every blow of the divine hand which fell upon the spotless Surety. Since, therefore, His sufferings were commensurate with the penal deserts of those whom He represented, His sufferings were limited. We hence conclude that the Expiation which was the out-come of those sufferings was correspondingly limited. Cause regulates effect. In this case the cause of the suffering was the sins of a numbered company (Isa. liii. 6, margin; Rom. iv. 25; 1 Cor. xv. 3; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Rev. vii. 9); when made to meet upon their responsible and competent Surety. The effect, therefore, must correspond therewith, and the a "value," "worth," "efficacy," "efficiency," "preciousness," or "sufficiency" (for the terms are employed with little apparent discrimination) of the Atonement, must be limited to those for whom it was made.

The above view is currently styled the Commercial View of the Atonement, though "the doctrine of a Commensurate Atonement" might be happier. It is opposed by Fullerites, "who base the extent of the Atonement on the glory and dignity of the Divine, Nature of Jesus, contending that is sacrifice was (on this account) of "infinite worth," enough to have been the means of saving ten thousand worlds."—DR. STOCK.

Somewhat similar is the view of G. W. Shepherd.—"It was the dignity of Christ’s person which determined the merit of His work." "The excellency of the Divine nature is communicated to the work done by Him in the human nature. His obedience is thereby Divine, and therefore of infinite efficacy." "If one sinner only was to have been saved, He could not have done less; had there been a million times as many, He could not have done more."

On the contrary, the view of John Stevens is, that “the demands, of impartial Justice (which Jesus met) were greater than if only one sinner had been ordained to salvation, and must have been proportioned to the number of those appointed to obtain salvation (by His sufferings.")—"HELP FOR THE TRUE DISCIPLES," page 180.

John Hazelton also speaks thus:—“It is said that ‘you should not take a commercial view of the Atonement.’ But ‘Ye are bought with a price.’ What is a commercial view of the Atonement, if it does not appear here? My friends, it is wicked, and altogether of the devil, to talk in this manner of the Atonement of Christ," namely to deny the doctrine enforced above.—Sermons, Vol. i. page 4. See TRACTS ON THE ATONEMENT by W. Palmer.

While, however, we endeavor to assign to the Atonement its scriptural proportions, we are careful to avoid ascribing limits to the Holy One of Israel. "Infinity should be connected with all His attributes."–(John Hazelton), but we distinguish between His attributes and His actions. His glory is infinite, but its displays are limited. His wisdom is infinite, but its manifestations are limited. His power is infinite, but its operations are limited. His love is infinite, but its objects are limited. It should, however, be remembered that those limitations have been determined by the Lord Himself. How superlatively glorious, therefore, the proportions and results of the, Atonement will finally prove to be, none can conceive. This we are assured, that they will be worthy of the infinitely blessed God.

William Jeyes Styles, A Manual of Faith and Practice, Designed for Young and Enquiring Christians (London: Printed by J. Briscoe, Banner Street, Finsbury, E.C., 1897), 45, 46–49. [Some spelling modernized; some reformatting; italics original; and underlining mine.]

Note: I should point out that Styles’s position is perverse. I have posted it to assist in presenting the contrast between orthodoxy and Hyper-Calvinism with the intent of showing what happens when a pecuniary based satisfaction model is pressed to its logical end.

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William Symington (1795–1862): “Exact Equivalency” Voids the Sincere Offer of the Gospel

2. It is alleged against our view of the extent of the atonement that it supposes an unnecessary redundancy in the merits of Christ’s death.

If Christ’s death be, intrinsically considered, of value sufficient for all, and yet designed only for some, does not this suppose a superabundance of merit, which is available for no end whatever, and with regard to which the question may be asked, “To what purpose is this waste?”

To this we reply, in the first place, that, even admitting the divine intention with respect to the atonement to be unlimited, the same difficulty meets us with regard to a restricted application. Whatever is the extent of destination, it is admitted that the actual efficiency is limited. Now, as in this case the degree of available merit exceeds the extent of actual good done, every one must perceive that there is as much room as in the other case for the question, “To what purpose is this waste?” The difficulty presses with as great force on the opinion of our opponents as on ours.

Again, it may be remarked, that it accords with the general procedure of God in other departments of his works, to confer his favors with a profusion which to many may seem redundant and unnecessary. For example, he causes his rain to fall on barren deserts, sterile rocks, and the watery deep, as well as on fertile hills and valleys. There are many fertile tracts of land which have never been cultivated; much spontaneous fruit grows in regions where there is not an inhabitant. And how many flowers expand their blossoms and diffuse their fragrance, in wilds where there is not a human being to admire their beauty or inhale their sweets. Are we at liberty to say that, in such cases, there is a wasteful exuberance of divine goodness or of providential care? No more can it be said that, in the case before us, there is an unnecessary redundance of merit. We must not, in the one case any more than in the other, presume to limit the Almighty, or to sit in judgment on the works of his hands; but firmly believe it will be seen in the end that he has done nothing in vain.

Moreover; let it be observed, that the objection proceeds on the mistaken supposition, that the atonement of Christ is an exact equivalent for the sins of men, and that, had the number to be saved been either more or less than they are, or had their sins been of greater or less amount, the sufferings of the Redeemer must have varied in proportion. Now, to this view of the subject there are insuperable objections. It is at variance with what we have before established, namely, the infinite intrinsic value of Christ’s atonement. It overlooks the grand design of the atonement, which was, not simply to secure a mere commutative satisfaction to the justice of God, but to glorify all the divine perfections, and to make an illustrious manifestation of the principles of his government before the whole universe of moral creatures. It leaves no room for such an unlimited offer of Christ in the Gospel, as to render those who reject him without excuse; for if the atonement of Christ bore an exact proportion, in point of worth, to the sins of those who are actually saved by it, then the salvation of any others was a natural impossibility, and no blame could attach to such for neglecting to embrace the proffered boon; indeed there would be no ground on which such an offer could be made. Nay, it would require us to believe, that a far greater display of the righteousness of God and his abhorrence at sin could have been made by the sufferings of men than by those of Christ; for, as, on the supposition in question, the number actually saved is limited, and the sufferings of Christ were an exact counterpart of the sufferings due to the sins of that limited number, it was only necessary that the whole human race should have suffered for their own sins, to secure an amount of suffering greatly superior to that of the Saviour of sinners. For these reasons, we reject the theory of atonement against which the objection is pointed, and hold by the view already explained, namely, that the sufferings of Christ are to be regarded in the light of a moral satisfaction to the law and justice of God, which would have been requisite had there been but one sinner to be saved, and had that sinner had but one sin, and which would have been adequate had the number to be saved been to any conceivable extent greater than it is. But to this view of the subject the objection does not apply, as the merit of the atonement is not greater than, according to this, is absolutely indispensable.

William Symington, On the Atonement and Intercession of Jesus Christ, Third Edition. (New York: Robert Carter, 1847), 207–209.

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Notes: (1) By the phrase “exact equivalency” Symington is referring to the idea that Christ suffered so much for so much sin, and Christ suffered for more sin and sinners, he would have suffered more; (2) Symington’s language of “exact equivalency” equals other language and phrases such as “strict equivalency” or of the preferred term in classical literature, “Idem;” (3) Generally speaking, the idea that Christ suffered so much for so much sin has always been associated with forms of Hyper-Calvinism (see for example the 19th century Hyper-Calvinist exponent, William Styles, and Owen Thomas’s excellent survey, The Atonement Controversy: In Welsh Theological Literature and Debate, 1707–1841 (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 2002); (4) While it is good that Symington recognized that an exact equivalentist view of the satisfaction means that between the salvation of all men there exists a physical impossibility and that the sincerity of the free offer is voided; however, he, nonetheless, failed to realize that even on his terms of a limited imputation of sin to Christ (namely, only the sins of the elect to the exclusion of the sins of the non-elect) the problems of a natural impossibility and of a voided sincere offer remain. If Christ did not sustain a penal and legal relationship with regard to the non-elect, then clearly no penal and legal provision has been obtained for them. Therefore, the satisfaction is not extrinsically sufficient, available, or adaptable to their penal and legal needs with respect to God’s legal demands upon them. They remain in the same state as if Christ has not died for anyone at all.

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Benedict Pictet (1655–1724) on God’s General Goodness and Love

With regard to what are called affection, although they do not properly exist in God, seeing they are connected with the ideas of passion or emotion, which argues weakness and mutability, and therefore would be contrary to the supreme happiness of God, yet are they attributed to him in the scripture, which speaks to men in their own style; but they do not designate, any passions or emotions, nor are to be understood as different wills or inclinations in the Deity, (for this would imply a changeableness in him,) but as acts of the same will, and denoting different relations of it. We will speak of the principal affections; and, first, of goodness. Now we call goodness that affection in God, by which he is inclined to communicate himself to his creatures. The scripture every where declares it, (Psalm xxxvi:6, 7; lxxiii.1; Acts xiv. 17); and even the heathen called their Jupiter Optimus Maximus, (very good and great); and, as Cicero observes, he is called optimus before maximus, because it is a greater and more acceptable thing, to do good to all, than to possess the greatest power. The first act of God’s goodness in time is creation; and because what is produced always depends on what produces it, the second act of goodness is preservation. This goodness, moreover, is either general, which embraces all creatures, or special, which regards human creatures, and most special, which regards the elect. Nor should it seem strange that God is not equally good towards his creatures, for in this inequality is displayed his sovereign freedom and dominion.

From the goodness springs the love of God, by which God is inclined towards the creature, and delights to do it good, and, as it were, to unite himself with it. There are three kinds of this love usually ascribed to God. The love of benevolence is that by which God is moved to will some good to his creature as a creature, without any regard to the excellence which may be in it. This kind of love is the same as his goodness, and by it God, from eternity, willed good to the creature, even though unworthy, and deserving of hatred. The love of beneficence is that by which God does good in time; this expression in time must be noted, so that this love may be distinguished from the love of benevolence which is from eternity. The love of complacency is that by which God is inclined towards the creature that is just and holy. By the first kind of love, God elects us; by the second, he redeems and sanctifies us; by the third, he rewards us being holy. Of this last Christ speaks, (John xiv. 21,)” He that hath my commandments, and keeps them, he it is that loves me; and he that loves me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him.” With this love of God is connected his grace, by which he is induced to communicate himself to the creature, freely and of his own accord; not from desert or debt, or any other cause out of himself and not to add any thing to himself, but for the benefit of the object of this grace. For grace is nothing else but unmerited favour; it is always opposed to merit; “If it be of grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace.” (Rom. xi. 6.) Now this word grace is taken in scripture, sometimes for God’s favour, by which he chose us from eternity unto life, sometimes for the favour, by which he receives us in time, and accepts us in the Son of his love, some times for the effects of grace, or the ordinary gifts bestowed by God on believers, such as faith, hope, and charity, or for the extraordinary gifts which were miraculously bestowed in the first ages, for the edification of the church. This grace is accompanied by mercy or pity, concerning which the Psalmist speaks, (Psalm ciii. 8; cxlv. 2; also Lament, iii. 22, 23,) which, as existing in God, is not a sorrow or sadness of mind arising from the miseries or evils of others, but a ready disposition to succor the miserable. It does not spring from any external cause, such as usually stirs up this emotion in human beings, but from the sole goodness of God. The greatness of this pity is shewn by the extreme unworthiness of those who are the objects of it, compared with his majesty, by the number of the sins they have committed, and the greatness of their misery—by the severity of divine justice—by the eternal duration of this pity—and by its innumerable effects.

Benedict Pictet, Christian Theology, trans. Frederick Reyroux (Fleet Street London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1834), 84–86; italics original, underlining mine.

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Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949) on God’s Permissive Decree

16. How does one designate God’s decree as it functions with respect to sin?

A permissive decree (decretum permissivum). This term has become accepted in Reformed dogmatics and is even found in most confessions. Our own [Belgic] Confession, on the doctrine of providence (Article 13), says, “[A]ll our enemies cannot harm us without His permission and will.”

Here and there objection is made to this distinction. Beza states it is not difficult to show that it is completely misunderstood by some, in a way that removes the devils and evil men from God’s control except that He keeps their actions and the consequences of their actions within certain limits. Nevertheless, Beza also wishes to see the terms decernius and permissivum (decreeing and permitting will) maintained, provided that they are explained correctly.

Danaeus speaks more dismissively: “From this it follows that that sophistical distinction that one is accustomed to make between God’s permission and His decree ought to be abandoned, because what happens by God’s permission happens with His will and consequently by virtue of His decree.”

a) First, it should be observed that by permissive decree the Lutherans understand something entirely negative. By it they mean that God does not decree to prevent or hinder sin by a positive act. Thus, sin itself is fully present in God’s decree as sure and certain. Concerning it God has nothing more to decide. His permissive decreeing, taken strictly, means to say that He does not decree rather than that He certainly decrees not, namely, to counter sin. This, of course, is a wrong and inadequate view. It teaches that sin has its reality and certainty from man. The former is true, as we have seen; the latter cannot be conceded. For, as for all things, so also for sin, certainty must lie in the decree of God. A permissive decree cannot be a bare budding in our spirit.

b) Others understand the permissive character of God’s decree concerning sin more in another sense, namely as follows:

God decrees in a positive manner that certain things will happen. However, sin as an unavoidable consequence adheres to these things that God decrees. Thus, if He wills these things, He must also permit sin. So, it comes down to this: God has permitted sin not for itself but because of its necessary connection with other things that He willed.

Usually this is worked out further as follows: At issue above everything was the freedom of the human will, that man, therefore, should choose for himself what he wanted, good or evil. Thus, involved as well in this freedom, in this possibility of going in either direction, was the permitting of evil, of sin.

This view is entirely unacceptable. It still makes only the possibility of sin an object of God’s decree, but not the certainty of sin. We must not only maintain that God tolerated that possibility but also that its certainty is the result of His permissive decree. It may not be thought as though God decreed to create man and then to wait on how the choice of man would turn out. That would be the Pelagian conditional decree applied to the situation of man before the fall. This view, then, is also completely at home within the orbit of Pelagian ideas.

c) There are different conceptions of God’s permissive decree that do not really pertain to the decreeing act but more to its execution and so need not be discussed here—for example, the difference between the formal and the material in sin. This is a point that has its place in the doctrine of providence and not here. Although one would see this distinction as a solution, it is of no help here, for God’s decree concerns both the formal and the material.

d) It is not possible to explain fully in a corroborating way how we are to think about God’s permissive decree. We wish, in general, to maintain the following:

1. The permissive decree is no less a certain decree than any other. Any thought as though we can speak of hesitation or uncertainty in God must be excluded by far. God is certain in everything He decrees, and for all things their certainty is secure solely in the decree of God. Also sin, in order to be certain, must be through God’s decree. The one who denies this deviates from Reformed doctrine. Just on this point lies the one great error of the church father Augustine, who wanted to make sin only an object of God’s foreknowledge but not of God’s decree. Calvin says as decisively as possible, “Man falls because God’s providence has so ordained it, but he falls by his own fault” (Institutes, 1.18.4); “I acknowledge that it is a horrible decree. Still, no one can deny that God certainly has known how it would turn out with man and that therefore He has known because he has so foreordained it in His decree.” “For the first man has fallen because the Lord judged that it ought to be so. Why He judged that remains hidden to us” (3.23.7, 8). But Calvin also lets the reverse come out, as we immediately hope to see.

2. As its object the permissive decree had sin in view as something contrary to God’s holy nature and on which His displeasure must rest. To permit something always means that it arouses my disapproval. Therefore, because on the one hand sin is against God’s holy nature, on the other hand there must have been considerations in God that nonetheless caused Him to decree to permit it. It is not granted to man to know these considerations in detail. It must be enough for us to know that through sin God knew to glorify Himself by His righteousness and His redeeming love.

3. By permitting sin in His decree God remains completely free of any wrong. Calvin: “The destruction of the godless depends on God’s decree such that the cause and nature of that destruction is to be sought in man himself.” “Through his own malevolence, man has corrupted the nature that he had received from his God.” “God could not have judged other than that man ought to fall, because He saw that thereby the honor of His name would properly come to light. And where one speaks of God’s honor, there His justice must immediately be in view, for what deserves praise, must be just.” Thus, according to Calvin, it is a just decree, both in its origin as in its content (cf. Institutes, 2.4.3–5, where Calvin goes much further than we would presume to and where in principle he rejects the permissive decree).

In the execution of this decree, too, there is nothing that can make God a cause of sin. On this point Scripture speaks as emphatically as possible. God tempts no one to evil (Jas 1:13). God is light and in Him there is no darkness (1 John 1:5). God made man upright, but they have sought out many schemes (Eccl 7:29). The Spirit of God teaches His children to praise all that is good as the work of God but also to ascribe blame for all that is evil only to themselves. This testimony of the Spirit in the believer, founded on God’s word, teaches us how this matter appears in God’s light, and we must believe it though that same light does not illumine our understanding.

Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. and trans. Richard B. Gaffin Jr., 5 vols. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2012–2016), 1:93–96.

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